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STUDENT PRESS LAW:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
This dissertation will identify and describe the state of the law regarding student
speech and press freedom. The following questions will be explored: What rights do
young people have? What standards have state and federal courts established? To what
extent and how clearly have state statutes defined student expressive rights? What do
state laws say about this topic? What issues have yet to be addressed, either because a
case has not raised certain issues or because the issue does not lend itself to compromise
or a clear solution? How does the capacity of social media for widespread and rapid
dissemination affect the balancing of First Amendment rights with other interests?
Among other topics, the dissertation will discuss the development of First
Amendment law, the strengthening of student expression law in the 1960s, the
curtailment of student expression rights at the K-12 level in the 1980s, and state
legislation that protects student expression at the K-12 and university levels. The
conclusion will contain strategies for the enhancement of students’ First Amendment
rights.
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PROLOGUE
This dissertation will identify and explore the development of student free
expression rights, with particular focus on cases and legislation that seek to balance such
rights with the needs of school officials to maintain discipline and teach responsibility.
The courts have struggled to develop consistent standards, especially with changing
technology presenting new challenges. As a result, student rights vary significantly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, a potentially troubling development considering that the First
Amendment is national in scope.
It will be argued that students are entitled to much greater First Amendment
protection than they are currently given in most states and that courts, legislators, and
school officials have a constitutional obligation to provide such enhanced protection.
Doing so will help students to learn valuable lessons about the importance of free
expression in a democratic society and will better protect discussion of public issues.
Federal and state courts have contributed to the development of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press rights of young adults through a series of decisions that
attempt to balance the First Amendment with the need for school officials to maintain a
positive learning environment. But because the U.S. Supreme Court has handed down
few rulings that address these issues, lower federal and state courts have stepped in to
deal with the difficult question of how much First Amendment protection should be
granted to students, especially when their journalism skills are underdeveloped, and they
may not understand that potential harm that inaccurate information or an invasion of
privacy might cause. Courts have not been alone in trying to define the boundaries of
such rights. Several state legislatures have extended First Amendment protection to
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student journalists—both in K-12 and at the college level—when their state courts
seemed unwilling to enhance such rights.
This dissertation will identify and discuss the most significant federal and state
cases related to student expression. It will also examine laws enacted by several state
legislators that address these issues. It will be argued that student rights—both at the K12 and college level—need to be enriched to protect the often important content that
young journalists disseminate and to provide an environment where students can learn the
importance of the First Amendment to a democratic society. Attention will be paid to
developing technology that makes it easier than ever for students to create content that is
widely and quickly disseminated but also challenges school officials, parents, judges, and
legislators to find the appropriate balance between student expression and other societal
rights.
In sum, this dissertation will explore the following questions: “To what extent do
young adults, both K-12 and college students, enjoy freedom of speech and freedom of
the press rights under the First Amendment? How should those rights be balanced with
other societal interests such as preventing interference with school discipline and
maintaining a positive educational environment?”

viii

CHAPTER ONE:
ORIGINS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
—First Amendment, U.S. Constitution
During the fight for independence and the founding period, Americans distrusted
a powerful, centralized government. Their experience with the king and parliament made
them wary of a distant and unaccountable authority that could limit their freedom and
influence their financial lives so profoundly. Thus, those who gathered in Philadelphia in
1787 to write the Constitution wanted to create a new government that would be
sufficiently strong to protect national interests while also maintaining the vitality of state
governments, which many people in the new nation thought would help preserve
individual liberties.
Because several prominent Federalists at the Philadelphia convention expected
the new federal government to be limited to the powers outlined in the proposed
Constitution, they did not believe at first that a list of personal rights was necessary—or
even a good idea. They especially worried that debate over individual civil rights in the
final days of the constitutional convention could unravel fragile compromises on other
issues, and some expected that any rights left off the list would be subject to infringement
by the new government from those arguing that such unenumerated rights were not meant
to be protected.
The Bill of Rights—the first 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution—is largely
credited to James Madison, who in 1789 was elected a member of the U.S. House in the
first Congress. Although Madison initially had doubts about the necessity of the
1

amendments, by the time he ran for election to the House from a district in central
Virginia, he had come to believe that such additions to the Constitution were strongly
supported by the people and would improve the new system. In addition, North Carolina
and Rhode Island—which objected to various sections of the Constitution—said they
would not join the union without a list of individual rights and liberties to curb the
potential tyranny of a strong centralized federal government.
The House of Representatives approved 17 amendments, but the Senate
eliminated some and combined others, eventually forwarding 12 amendments to the
House. Those 12 were sent to the states for approval in September of 1789. Of those, 10
were ratified, with Virginia the final state to ratify the amendments in December of
1791. 1
Freedom of Speech: Influential Voices
Numerous writers played a role in influencing the founders’ thinking on the value
of freedom of speech and the press as they were incorporated into the First Amendment.
For example, Cato’s Letters or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious—a collection of
letters and essays written in the early 18th century by two British writers under a
pseudonym—were read by the founders both before and after the Revolution. Letter No.
15 (Feb. 4, 1720) states: “Freedom of speech is the great bulwark of liberty; they prosper
and die together: And it is the terror of traitors and oppressors, and a barrier against them.
It produces excellent writers, and encourages men of fine genius.” The language from
Cato’s Letter No. 15 is reflected in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was used as
the model for the Bill of Rights. Similarly, Letter No. 32 (“Reflections Upon Libelling”)
addresses the law of libel and its impact on the freedom of press. 2
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Of the 13 state constitutions adopted during the revolutionary period, 10
contained protections for speech or the press. 3 For example, the Massachusetts
Constitution stated: “The Liberty of the Press is essential to the security of freedom in a
State, it ought not, therefore, be restrained in this Commonwealth.” 4 The New
Hampshire Constitution stated: “The Liberty of the press is essential to the security of
freedom in a State; it ought, therefore, to be inviolably preserved.” 5 The Vermont
Constitution combined speech and press for the first time, explaining that “the People
have a Right to Freedom of Speech, and of writing and publishing their Sentiments;
therefore the Freedom of the Press ought not to be restrained.” 6
The states also expressed their views about freedom of speech and freedom of the
press when holding conventions to decide whether to ratify the proposed federal
constitution. The Proposal of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention of
December 12, 1787, states: “The people have a right to the freedom of speech, of writing,
and of publishing their sentiments, therefore, the freedom of the press shall not be
restrained by any law of the United States.” Likewise, the Maryland Ratifying
Convention Proposal of April 29, 1788, states: “The people have a right to freedom of
speech, of writing and publishing their sentiments, and therefore … the freedom of the
press ought not be restrained, and the printing presses ought to be free to examine the
proceedings of government, and the conduct of its officers.”
Free Speech and the Revolutionary Cause
The right to speak freely, to publish one’s sentiments, to criticize government and
public officials, was so important to those who formed the new nation that they
frequently referred to such rights when seeking help for their revolutionary cause and
when forming a new government after independence.
3

In an attempt to draw support for the American Revolution from the Canadian
provinces, the First Continental Congress sent a message to the inhabitants of Quebec in
1774, highlighting its views of basic freedoms. The address specifically mentions press
freedom, stating, “The importance of [freedom of the press] consists, besides the
advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal
sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts
between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby
oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated into more honorable and just modes of
conducting affairs.” 7
Interpretations of the First Amendment
Only seven years after the First Amendment became part of the Constitution, it
became clear how precarious freedom of speech and press would be in the new republic.
A Federalist Congress and President John Adams were willing to enact and sign a law
that history has clearly determined was a violation of the First Amendment. (The term
“Federalist” originally referred to supporters of the Constitution, but by the 1790s was the
name of the political affiliation of Washington, Adams, Hamilton, and others opposed to
Jefferson’s political views.) The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 came about after the
French Revolution and during a turbulent conflict with France. The acts gave the
president the power to criminalize criticism of the president and Congress (but not Vice
President Thomas Jefferson, a political enemy). Purportedly aimed at curbing French and
Irish immigration and protecting national security, the laws were intended to decrease the
number of voters who (1) disagreed with the Federalist Party and (2) supported Thomas
Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican party, many of whom were Irish and French
immigrants. The laws gave the executive branch wide discretion to deport those who
4

might create problems for the government and to punish newspaper publishers who
criticized the administration. 8
Early 20th Century Interpretations
Although the First Amendment became part of the Constitution in 1791, it was
not until the early part of the 20th century that the Supreme Court began to interpret it. In
1907, the Court issued its first opinion in a press freedom case, Patterson v. Colorado.
This case involved a request for the Court to review, under the First Amendment, a
contempt-of-court conviction of U.S. Senator Thomas Patterson, who published a
newspaper editorial ridiculing the Colorado State Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme
Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because “what constitutes contempt, as well as the
time during which it may be committed, is a matter of local law.” 9
The conclusion of the Court in the Patterson case reflects one of the leastunderstood characteristics of our constitutional system. For much of the nation’s history,
the Bill of Rights—especially the First Amendment and Fourth through Eighth
Amendments—applied only to the federal government. In other words, if a state violated
someone’s right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press, the First Amendment
provided no help. The Supreme Court had confirmed in Barron v. Baltimore in 1833 that
the framers wanted to provide protection from the new, central government and were less
worried about state infringement. Note the text of the First Amendment: “Congress shall
make no law …” (emphasis added). The process of eventually requiring the states to
abide by most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights took a long time. The Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified after the Civil War, offered the basis for the change when it
included a provision saying, “…nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
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property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” 10
During World War I, free speech became more restricted. In 1917, Congress
passed the Espionage Act, criminalizing “insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal
of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States,” and making it a crime to
obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the U.S. military. 11 Later in the war,
Congress passed the Sedition Act, which outlawed spoken or printed criticism of the
federal government, the U.S. Constitution, or the American flag. 12
“Clear and Present Danger”
In 1919, in the case of Schenck v. U.S., Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes set forth
his “clear-and-present-danger” test, part of which states:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is
at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as
men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right. 13
The events of this case began when Charles T. Schenck and Elizabeth Baer, members of
the Socialist Party, were accused of urging draftees to oppose the draft and “not submit to
intimidation.” In upholding the convictions, Holmes wrote that not all speech is
protected by the First Amendment, and he cited the now-famous example of falsely
shouting “fire” in a crowded theater. In the same month, March 1919, the Court decided
another sedition case, Debs v. United States, upholding the conviction of socialist
presidential candidate Eugene V. Debs under the Espionage Act. Debs was convicted for
making speeches opposing World War I. Holmes applied the “clear and present danger”
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test by stating that Debs’s speeches had the “natural tendency and reasonably probable
effect” of obstructing military recruitment. 14 Importantly, the “clear and present danger”
test features two independent conditions: first, the threat that a substantive evil (such as
overthrowing the government) might follow from some speech, and second, the high
likelihood of that threat having a negative impact. 15
There is great irony in the way the Court first interpreted the First Amendment.
The amendment had been largely dormant for 125 years, since it was ratified in 1791, yet
when the Court finally began to interpret it, the Court showed how limited was the
protection for controversial speech. Schenck’s dissemination of circulars to young men
called up for the draft (which Holmes recognized had no impact) and Debs’s relatively
tame speech in Canton, Ohio, (which mostly discussed capitalism and socialism and did
not encourage lawless action) were considered unprotected speech at the time. Holmes
justified this intrusion on the First Amendment because the country was at war.
The Abrams Dissent
Later in 1919, the Court issued its decision in Abrams v. U.S., a case involving the
conviction of five Russian immigrants under the Sedition Act. Many legal scholars and
historians consider Holmes’s dissent in Abrams as a defining moment in the evolution of
modern free speech jurisprudence. Before exploring the dissent, it is necessary to
understand the context of the Court’s decision. The Act made it a crime to “willfully
utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about
the form of the Government of the United States” or to “willfully urge, incite, or advocate
any curtailment of the production” of the things “necessary or essential to the prosecution
of the war.” 16 The Russian immigrants (which included Jacob Abrams) produced leaflets
criticizing the U.S. military’s involvement in Russia and advocated a general strike in
7

factories that made military supplies. As with the decisions in Schenck and Debs, the
Court upheld the convictions. However, unlike in those cases, Holmes dissented. The
possible reasons for Holmes’s change of heart will be explored in the next chapter.
Joined by Justice Louis Brandeis, Holmes wrote a dissent in Abrams that remains
famous as one of the Court’s best defenses of free speech. In it, Holmes introduced the
“marketplace of ideas” concept, stating that because weak or dangerous ideas eventually
will be supplanted by better ideas, the government must not censor speech. 17 It is a
theory the Supreme Court has often used in deciding free speech and free press cases.
Holmes insisted that his opinions in Schenck and Debs had applied the correct
constitutional standard. He repeated in Abrams that the First Amendment does not
protect “speech that produces or is intended to produce clear and imminent danger that it
will bring about forthwith ... substantive evils.” 18 But in his Abrams dissent, he modified
his views by holding that speech may be restricted only if there is an explicit effort to
incite lawless acts. Holmes wrote about how problematic it would be to assume that “the
surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man ... would present any
immediate danger.” 19
Free Speech Protections Gain Momentum
After 1919, the First Amendment tide began to turn. Although the Court upheld
the New York criminal anarchy statute in the 1925 case, Gitlow v. New York, in which
Benjamin Gitlow was convicted for writing The Left Wing Manifesto, the Court held that
the free-speech clause of the First Amendment applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 20 In the 1931 case Stromberg v. California, the Court
overturned the state court conviction of a 19-year-old Communist under a state law
prohibiting the display of a red flag as “an emblem of opposition to the United States
8

government.” Stromberg was the first case in which the Court recognized that protected
speech included symbolic expression. 21
Later in 1931, the Court decided Near v. Minnesota, a case involving a Minnesota
statute that gave state court judges the power to enjoin as “nuisances” any “malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical.” In this case, a
county attorney obtained a court order preventing further publication of The Saturday
Press. But the Court struck down the Minnesota law, holding that it was “the essence of
censorship.” The Court recognized that the primary aim of the First Amendment free
press right was to prevent prior restraints of the press, thus holding that, except in very
rare cases, such censorship is unconstitutional. 22 While Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes’s opinion strengthened the First Amendment protection against prior restraint, it
also held that prior restraint may be permitted under some circumstances. 23 Nevertheless,
Hughes noted that although freedom of the press may be abused, it does not make it any
less necessary to protect the press from prior restraint. In fact, if government officials
could determine which stories could and could not be published, a more serious evil
would result: “Charges of reprehensible conduct, and in particular of official
malfeasance, unquestionably create a public scandal, but the theory of the constitutional
[guarantee] is that even a more serious public evil would be caused by authority to
prevent publication,” Hughes wrote. 24
The Sullivan Case: A Victory for Press Freedom
First Amendment protections against the punishment of speech that has already
been disseminated (as opposed to the prior restraint of speech) took root in Hughes’s
opinion in Near and ultimately bore fruit with the milestone First Amendment holding in
New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964. One of the most significant holdings from Sullivan
9

is the protection of the press against defamation claims. Under the Alabama defamation
law at issue in the New York Times case, editorial content did not need to be false, but
merely capable of injuring someone’s reputation or bringing him “into public
contempt.” 25 The Court held that the law placed an unconstitutional burden on the
freedom of the press: “Raising as it does the possibility that a good-faith critic of
government will be penalized for his criticism, the proposition relied on by the Alabama
courts strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free
expression.” 26 In the end, the Court established a new First Amendment test, protecting
the right to criticize public officials from defamation claims, unless the plaintiff can
prove the statement was made with knowledge that it was false—or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false. 27
Distinctions Between Speech and Press Clauses
Scholars disagree over whether the press should have special rights. If it does not,
does that make the Press Clause a redundancy? Is the Press Clause simply a natural
extension of the Speech Clause, or does the Press Clause have a functional role to play?
Although journalists tend to argue that the Press Clause exists for a reason and implies
extra protection, the Supreme Court has distanced itself from that idea. This was not
always the case, however. Dating back to the first U.S. Supreme Court cases, judges
have avoided reading the Constitution as if it had superfluous language, and this tendency
lends credence to the idea that the Press Clause ought to have a separate purpose. 28 Yet
some scholars argue that the Press Clause has, in the last half century, been treated by the
Supreme Court as mere “surplus” language. 29
Historically, the Press Clause has served a different function from that of the
Speech Clause. The purpose of speech was to provide an outlet for personal expression
10

and the free flow of ideas. 30 The purpose of the press was to educate the public, provide
a forum for debate, and to expose government corruption and wrongdoing. In
“Awakening the Press Clause,” a 2011 article in the UCLA Law Review, Sonja R. West
writes, “[I]t was believed that a free press afforded [the] capability of government
preservation better than free speech or petitioning representatives ever could.” 31 Despite
the Supreme Court’s reluctance to recognize special privileges for members of
professional newsgathering organizations, lower courts have generally upheld press
access to crime scenes, disaster areas, illegal disorders, and police blotters. 32 The
military has a longstanding tradition of creating access to the press, particularly in war
zones. 33 There is a similar tradition at executions. 34 And there is a longstanding tradition
and some statutory protection for press galleries in criminal trials. 35 In the 1980 case
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia 36 and again in the two Riverside Press decisions in the
1980s, 37 the Supreme Court has ruled courts must be open to the public—and also open
to the press as a surrogate for the public. The press has also been recognized as a conduit
for government officials to disseminate important information to the public. 38 Reaching
further back in history, the distinct function of the press has been acknowledged in other
ways. During the pre-Revolutionary War Stamp Act rebellion, for example, Americans
protected the press from targeted government taxation. Much later, a Louisiana law
imposing a license tax on all publishers of newspapers or magazines having circulation of
more than 20,000 copies was held unconstitutional because it abridged the freedom of the
press. 39 It should be noted that newspapers can be taxed in the United States. However,
this politically motivated tax was clearly targeted at the critics of Senator Huey Long. At
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the time, large newspapers often criticized him, while small newspapers tended to support
him.
Today, the Press Clause does not seem to have its own meaning distinct from the
First Amendment’s protection for expression that is in the Free Speech Clause. In the past
few decades, the Court has found that the Press Clause provides no protection (1) against
subpoena or search warrant, (2) from identifying sources, or (3) for newsroom work. 40
There is no right to information outside of the Freedom of Information Act, even if the
government has no reason to keep the information secret. 41
The First Amendment and Public Schools
One of the foundational cases involving the First Amendment and public schools
is the 1969 case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. The case
arose from a dispute involving students who were suspended from two Iowa public
schools (a middle school and a high school) because they wore armbands to protest the
United States’ involvement in Vietnam. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
students. Writing for the majority, Justice Abe Fortas said:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has
been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years. 42
The Court also put protections in place so that schools would not have to sacrifice
their educational mission in order to offer free speech:
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech. 43
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The Court did not address off-campus speech, but held that schools could, in exceptional
circumstances, inhibit student speech “in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the
campus during the authorized hours.” 44
The ruling tries to strike a balance: Student rights must be protected, but schools
must be able to operate in an orderly fashion. However, because of other cases that will
be discussed here and in subsequent chapters, Tinker is not necessarily the starting point
for discussion of students’ rights at school. When it comes to the application of student
rights across the United States, inconsistencies abound. At the very least, one would
assume that university students (who are adults) have more free speech rights than K-12
students. But this is not always the case. Today, for example, high school students in
California appear to enjoy more robust protections for their expression than do college
students in Indiana. This result comes from the fact that California statutory law has been
interpreted to grant high school students many of the same protections for their free
speech at school that they would receive by virtue of the First Amendment outside of
school. Meanwhile, university administrators in Indiana retain substantial authority to
regulate speech within student newspapers. Because Indiana has no laws specifically
protecting student journalists, the status of free expression rights of university students in
that state derives largely from decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Indiana retains the authority to regulate speech by
student journalists under applicable First Amendment precedents. 45
In the 1988 decision Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, which will be discussed in detail in
later chapters, the Supreme Court outlined a two-level inquiry that courts employ when
addressing the issue of student censorship. The first question in this inquiry is whether
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the student publication at issue “may appropriately be characterized as a forum for public
expression.” 46 The answer to this question hinges on whether “school authorities have by
policy or by practice opened [the publication] for indiscriminate use by…some segment
of the public, such as student organizations.” 47 If school officials have done so, then the
First Amendment applies with relative force, and school officials can only censor speech
“when necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with school work or
discipline…or the rights of others.” 48
If school officials have not created a public forum, by contrast, then the second
question becomes whether the school officials have acted reasonably in censoring student
speech. 49 Under this more relaxed standard, officials may censor speech for an array of
reasons that would be impermissible under a traditional First Amendment analysis,
including the perceived acceptability of the speech and the “emotional maturity” of the
intended audience.
Two basic justifications underlie the Supreme Court’s decision to allow greater
speech controls in this setting. First, the Court held, “[t]he question whether the First
Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech…is different from the
question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote
particular student speech.” 50 This is true because “[t]he former question addresses
educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the
school premises…[while] [t]he latter question concerns educators’ authority over schoolsponsored…expressive activities…” 51 The second justification will be explored in the
next chapter.
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Hazelwood and Higher Education
The Hazelwood court declined to answer whether Hazelwood would apply in a
university setting. 52 In the 2005 case Hosty v. Carter, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit answered this question in the affirmative for courts within its
circuit, holding that Hazelwood is the “starting point” for an analysis of regulations on a
college student periodical. 53 The main question before the Hosty court involved qualified
immunity for a university dean, which will be explored in Chapter 4. However, the case
raised many other questions involving student press rights at public universities. In this
introductory chapter, the most important fact to mention is that a Supreme Court decision
involving a high school newspaper was being invoked as a precedent for a university
freedom of the press lawsuit, which alarmed many student press advocates. Note the last
line of the following statement by Judge Frank Easterbrook, who wrote the opinion in
Hosty:
To the extent that the justification for editorial control depends on the
audience’s maturity, the difference between high school and university
students may be important. (Not that any line could be bright; many high
school seniors are older than some college freshmen, and junior colleges
are similar to many high schools.) To the extent that the justification
depends on other matters—not only the desire to ensure high standards for
the student speech that is disseminated under [the school’s] auspices’…but
also the goal of dissociating the school from ‘any position other than
neutrality on matters of political controversy’…there is no sharp
difference between high school and college papers (emphasis added). 54
In spite of other potential distinctions between the high school setting and the
university setting, one of Hosty’s holdings is that the existence or non-existence of a
public forum controls almost entirely the question of censorship by university officials.
“If the paper operated in a public forum, the University could not vet its contents,” the
court held, indicating that if the newspaper is a public forum, the university is severely
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restricted from interfering with the content. 55 At the same time, the court held that
“underwritten student publications” that qualify as a “non-public forum” can be censored
by university officials for “legitimate pedagogical reasons,” thus indicating that a great
deal of censorship might be tolerated where the public forum question is answered in the
negative. 56
State Protection
While the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment sets a
floor in terms of speech protection, a state may choose to provide greater protection for
speech and press. In the context of student speech generally and high school newspaper
publications in particular, California has chosen to do just that. 57 The California
Education Code contains two relevant provisions that California courts have interpreted
to provide greater protection for student speech than does the First Amendment as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hazelwood and other cases. First, Section
48907 provides (subject to statutorily enumerated exceptions 58) that “[p]upils of the
public schools…shall have the right to exercise freedom of speech and of the press
including, but not limited to…the right of expression in official publications, whether or
not the publications or other means of expression are supported financially by the school
or by use of school facilities.” 59 It further provides, “[p]upil editors of official school
publications shall be responsible for assigning and editing the news, editorial, and feature
content of their publications subject to the limitations of this section…” 60 Second,
Section 48950 of the Code grants California students the same First Amendment
protections at school that they have out of school:
A school district operating one or more high schools, a charter school, or a
private secondary school shall not make or enforce a rule subjecting a high
school pupil to disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is
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speech or other communication that, when engaged in outside of the
campus, is protected from governmental restriction by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 2 of Article I of
the California Constitution. 61
Sections 48907 and 48950 provide more protection for student speech than do the
opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court based on the First Amendment. 62 Under the U.S.
Supreme Court precedent in Hazelwood, non-public-forum speech can be subject to
reasonable regulations in high schools; under the Seventh Circuit’s Hosty decision, this
speech is also subject to regulation on the university level. (Importantly, Hosty is binding
in the Seventh Circuit only. But as with many decisions of a U.S. court of appeals, courts
outside of the Seventh Circuit (which includes Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin) may find
the ruling to be persuasive and apply the Hosty standards to their own cases.
In California, by contrast, “section 48907 confers editorial control of official
student publications on the student editors alone, with very limited exceptions,” and this
is the case whether or not the publication would qualify as a “public forum.” 63 Thus—
even when a California high school does not open a publication to student groups or
parents, thus creating a limited public forum, school officials may not exercise control
over the content of the publication unless they can establish an applicable exception
under Section 48907 or 48950. Moreover, the statutory exceptions in California have
generally been interpreted narrowly, and thus the California law supports student rights
energetically. 64
Mixed Messages
As will be explored later in this dissertation, Tinker v. Des Moines and Hazelwood
v. Kuhlmeier, as well as subsequent court decisions applying these precedents, often send
mixed messages as to First Amendment protections for K-12 students. To make matters
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more complicated, Hazelwood, especially as applied by other courts, is not limited only
to students’ freedom of the press. It has been applied more broadly to apply to other
expressive activities that could be considered “school-sponsored” and allows for
restrictions on speech “so long as [they] are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.” 65 For example, in 2004, in Bannon v. School District of Palm Beach County,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that a high school could restrict
student art work on a mural painted as part of a beautification project because (1) the
principal explicitly instructed students that none of the murals could be profane or
offense, (2) a faculty member supervised the project, and (3) students were not told that
the murals were a forum for expressing their political or religious views. 66
The Third Circuit's decision in 2013 in B.H. v. Easton Area School District
adopted a very narrow reading of the Supreme Court’s precedents as to when a standard
other than Tinker could be applied to student speech. 67 The court held that the school
could not restrict students’ right to wear “I ♥ boobies! Keep A BREAST” bracelets
supporting breast cancer awareness. Specifically, the court said that there are three
narrow circumstances in which the government may restrict student speech even when
there is no risk of substantial disruption or invasion of others’ rights: first, the
government may restrict vulgar, lewd, profane, or plainly offensive speech in schools,
even if it would not be obscene outside of school; second, the government may likewise
restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use
and that cannot plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue;
and third, the government may impose restrictions on school-sponsored speech that are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 68
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However, this narrow reading has not been universally adopted by courts and, in
fact, many courts struggling with students’ out-of-school Internet conduct have not
limited their analyses to Tinker’s standard. In J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School
District, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted the struggle over what standard to apply
to cases involving websites created outside of school and students’ other Internet
conduct. 69 Additionally, in Tatro v. University of Minnesota, the Minnesota Supreme
Court applied the Hazelwood standard, allowing the university to discipline a graduate
student for a Facebook post that violated a regulation requiring respect, discretion, and
confidentiality in connection with work on human cadavers. 70 Therefore, the case law
has not established a bright-line distinction between the Tinker standard for students’
freedom of speech and Hazelwood standard for students’ freedom of the press. As this
dissertation will demonstrate, the struggle to balance the First Amendment rights of
students with other societal interests, including the orderly operation of the school, has
been anything but easy. This dissertation attempts to define the landscape of student
press rights and, in the final chapter, offer a few solutions.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES
In the United States’ system of government, the portion of a judge’s opinion that
is directly related to the facts of the case often has the same legitimacy as a statute
enacted by a legislative body. Judicial rulings are binding on all courts that are
subservient to them in the legal hierarchy. In addition, judicial opinions that explain the
reasons for the judges’ decisions provide valuable commentary and insight into the issues
and the competing interests involved and may discuss issues that need to be addressed in
the future in other cases or by legislatures.
Yet no matter how clear the standards appear to be when they come from judicial
rulings, courts retain a substantial amount of discretion to interpret constitutional rights,
statutes, rules promulgated by administrative agencies, and cases decided by other courts.
Therefore, one of the main reasons judges write in-depth opinions that contain
substantive and historical analysis and reasoning is to persuade others of the wisdom of
their position. Judges often draft lengthy opinions that analyze both sides of an issue
before rendering a decision. Courts of last resort—like state supreme courts and the
United States Supreme Court—often engage in lengthy analysis for the primary purpose
of explaining and supporting their views on an issue. Judges often include dicta in their
opinion, statements that are used to illustrate their argument or provide an example.
Dicta, by definition, are not based on the facts of the case and therefore are not supposed
to be cited as precedent by other courts in subsequent cases.
Development of First Amendment Law
To analyze the First Amendment rights of students in the present day, one must
understand the seminal Supreme Court decisions that form the foundation of First
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Amendment rights. The Supreme Court’s authority to review the constitutionality of
federal and state statutes was established in the early years of the republic. The case that
formed the legal basis for the Supreme Court’s power to strike down the actions of
Congress was Marbury v. Madison in 1803. 71 Before this decision, there was no clear
authority for the courts to void an act of Congress that conflicted with the Constitution.
The Constitution does not explicitly provide for judicial review. In other words, Marbury
v. Madison supports the proposition that the courts, not the legislative or executive
branches, ultimately decide constitutional questions. 72
The Supreme Court did not begin ruling on First Amendment cases until more
than a century after the Bill of Rights’ ratification in 1791. Furthermore, freedom of
speech and press in the First Amendment applied only to the federal government until
1925, when the Supreme Court, using the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, concluded that speech was one of the liberties protected from state as well
as federal infringement. The Bill of Rights was proposed and ratified primarily for the
purpose of providing explicit protection from the new federal government. State
governments—with which the people had more experience and which were considered
more accountable—were seen as less of a threat. Chief Justice Marshall, in the Barron v.
Baltimore case in 1833, confirmed that the rights guaranteed by the First and the Fourth
through the Eighth Amendments applied only to the federal government. 73 Note the text
of the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law …” (emphasis added). The First
Amendment (1) did not prohibit sovereign states from passing laws restricting the
freedom of speech or religion, and (2) did not apply to actions by the states or local
governments until well after the post-Civil War ratification of the Fourteenth
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Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant part, provides that “No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States.” 74 This was later interpreted in a way that allowed most of the Bill of
Rights to be applied to states as well as the federal government.
In 1907, the Supreme Court issued its first opinion in a press freedom case,
Patterson v. Colorado. 75 This case involved a request for the U.S. Supreme Court to
review, under the First Amendment, the contempt-of-court conviction of U.S. Senator
Thomas Patterson (who also published a Colorado newspaper) for articles and a political
cartoon lampooning the Colorado State Supreme Court. Ultimately, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, writing for the U.S. Supreme Court, held that the Court lacked
jurisdiction because “What constitutes contempt, as well as the time during which it may
be committed, is a matter of local law.” 76
The Court declined to decide whether the First Amendment applies to the states
and local governments via the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court stated that the freespeech and free-press guarantees of the First Amendment protected only against prior
restraint and not “subsequent punishment.” 77 This distinction is important. Today, this
decision by Holmes (who later became a strong defender of free speech) is criticized as a
misunderstanding of the scope of the First Amendment. Courts no longer consider
subsequent punishment of speech to be outside the protections of the First Amendment. If
speech could be punished without limitation, individuals would likely censor themselves,
rather than risk future punishment, giving the First Amendment little practical meaning.
Wartime Interpretation of the First Amendment
Nevertheless, during World War I, the government put several restrictions on
speech. In 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act, criminalizing “insubordination,
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disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States,”
and making it a crime to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the U.S.
military. 78 Later in the war, Congress passed the Sedition Act, which outlawed spoken or
printed criticism of the federal government, the U.S. Constitution, or the American flag. 79
One of the first challenges to the Espionage Act began in Philadelphia. On
August 13, 1917, members of the city’s Socialist Party gathered for their monthly
meeting. In the meeting, they directed their general secretary, Charles Schenck, to
prepare a leaflet to mail to draft-age men. 80 One side of the leaflet said: “Long live the
Constitution of the United States,” and it reprinted the text of the Thirteenth Amendment,
abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude. The text also said, “A conscript is little
better than a convict,” 81 and it urged people to “come to the headquarters of the socialist
party, and sign a petition to congress, for the repeal of the Conscription Act.” 82 After
federal officials learned of the leaflet, Schenck and fellow socialist Elizabeth Baer were
tried and convicted for violating the Espionage Act. (Two other defendants were found
not guilty.)
Those not familiar with this period of the Court’s history and the result of this
case might assume that Schenck’s conviction would have been overturned for two main
reasons. First, the First Amendment specifically forbids Congress from abridging free
speech. The Espionage Act, which blatantly abridges free speech, was passed by
Congress. Second, by the time the Supreme Court heard this case, the war was over, with
the United States and its allies as the victors. However, writing the opinion of the Court,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes upheld the conviction:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in
saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their
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constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the
circumstances in which it is done. The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against
uttering words that may have all the effect of force. The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court
could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. 83
In the same month, March 1919, the Court decided Debs v. U.S., upholding the
conviction of Socialist presidential candidate Eugene V. Debs under the Espionage Act.
Debs was convicted for making speeches opposing America’s involvement in World War
I. Importantly, the speeches mostly discussed capitalism and socialism and did not call
for unlawful action. Instead, the speech urged “continuous, active, and public opposition
to the war, through demonstrations, mass petitions, and all other means within our
power.” 84 Nevertheless, Holmes applied the “clear and present danger” test from the
recently decided Schenck case by stating that Debs’s speeches had the “natural tendency
and reasonably probable effect” of obstructing military recruitment. 85
Justice Holmes Reconsiders
Later that same year, in 1919, Justices Holmes and Louis Brandeis took a step
toward modern free speech rights in Abrams v. U.S. This case involved the conviction of
several Russian immigrants under the Sedition Act during World War I. The Act made it
a crime to “willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or
abusive language about the form of the Government of the United States” or to “willfully
urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of the production” of the things “necessary or
essential to the prosecution of the war.” 86 The Russian immigrants (including Abrams)
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produced leaflets criticizing the U.S. military’s involvement in Russia and advocated a
general strike in factories that made military supplies. They then tossed the leaflets out
the window of a building in New York City. 87 The Court, just as it did in Schenck and
Debs, upheld the convictions. However, unlike in those cases, Holmes dissented in
Abrams. His dissent is considered one of the most important defenses of free speech in
the Court’s history. 88
Historians have debated Holmes’s change in position. Some believe that the June
1919 publication of a Harvard Law Review article called “Freedom of Speech in War
Time,” which advocated for more free speech under the First Amendment and
specifically criticized Holmes’s opinions in Schenck and Debs, was partly responsible. In
the article, Professor Zechariah Chaffee Jr. wrote, “The true meaning of freedom of
speech seems to be this. One of the most important purposes of society and government
is the discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general concern. This is possible only
through absolutely unlimited discussion.” 89
However, Hand’s biographer contends that Holmes’s correspondence with New
York federal District Judge Learned Hand (cited by Chaffee in the same article) was the
most important factor in Holmes’s change of opinion. Hand’s 1917 decision in Masses
Publishing Co. v. Patten—holding that the magazine The Masses could not be banned
from the mail under the World War I Espionage Act—articulated a liberal understanding
of First Amendment values two years before the Supreme Court grappled with the same
issues. 90 In his Abrams dissent, Holmes ultimately presented an argument strikingly
similar to Hand’s defense of free speech. 91 Holmes stood by his opinions in Schenck and
Debs, but he altered his First Amendment standard, stating that the government could
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constitutionally restrict and punish “speech that produces or is intended to produce clear
and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith ... substantive evils” (emphasis
added). 92
The critical difference seemed to be the use of the word “imminent” instead of
“present” and the addition of the qualifier “forthwith.” In making these adjustments,
Holmes set forth a tougher standard of scrutiny, allowing speech restrictions only if there
is a direct and immediate connection between an act of speech and a subsequent crime.
Holmes wrote about how dubious and speculative it would be to assume that “the
surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man ... would present any
immediate danger.” 93 More importantly, he argued for the social and political benefits of
unrestrained free speech, stating that, “The best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out.” 94
Legal scholars often wonder why Holmes would argue to uphold Debs’s
conviction but not the defendants in the Abrams case. Despite the primitive method of
distribution in Abrams (throwing pamphlets out the window of a New York building), the
defendants did urge munitions workers to stop making weapons that were essential for
the conduct of the war. This action would seemingly constitute a more serious threat to
the war effort than Debs’ relatively tame speech in Canton, Ohio. Still, for reasons that
may never be entirely clear, Holmes concluded that the First Amendment did not protect
Debs, but did protect the Abrams defendants. This demonstrates that the change in
Holmes’s view had more to do with the evolution of his thinking about the First
Amendment than with the facts of the two cases.
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The Continuing Application of “Clear and Present Danger”
The Supreme Court did not immediately embrace the principles identified by
Holmes in his Abrams dissent. Instead, the Court continued to use various modifications
of Holmes’s “clear and present danger” analysis until 1969, when it established a direct
incitement standard in Brandenburg v. Ohio that is much more akin to the Holmes dissent
in Abrams. In Brandenburg, the U.S. Supreme Court said that “constitutional guarantees
of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” 95 The
standard created by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg makes it difficult for authorities
to punish even potentially dangerous speech, because there has to be a direct connection
between the speech and the lawless action committed by someone who was inspired by
those words. Unless someone acts upon the call for lawless action, and unless there is an
immediate and direct connection between the speech and the act, the First Amendment
protects the speech. However, it is worth noting again that such a liberal understanding
of the First Amendment did not permeate the Court until five decades after Holmes’
Abrams dissent. In the 1920s, the Court was only beginning its journey toward more
robust protection for controversial speech.
The First Amendment Is Applied to the States
In terms of free speech protection, a giant leap forward occurred in the 1925 case
Gitlow v. New York. Gitlow, a New York socialist, was convicted under New York’s
Criminal Anarchy Law of 1902 for publishing a document called “Left Wing Manifesto,”
and he challenged his conviction under the First Amendment. 96 Although the Supreme
Court upheld the conviction, the Court for the first time incorporated freedom of speech
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under the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, saying: “For present purposes we
may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press ... are among the fundamental
personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States.” 97 The Gitlow decision was of transcendent
importance because it allowed courts to apply the First Amendment when reviewing state
and local laws.
In 1931, the Court decided Stromberg v. California, in which it overturned the
state court conviction of a 19-year-old Young Communist League member under a state
law prohibiting the display of a red flag as “an emblem of opposition to the United States
government.” 98 This precedent became more important in the decades following the
court’s decision in the case.
Later in 1931, the Court made another leap forward in First Amendment rights in
Near v. Minnesota. While Schenck, Debs, and Gitlow were free speech cases, Near was a
case involving freedom of the press. This case involved a Minnesota statute that gave
state court judges the power to enjoin as “nuisances” any “malicious, scandalous and
defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical.” 99 This granted state judges the
extraordinary power to stop a publication either before it was disseminated or, as in the
Near case, to prevent continued publication. In the events leading up to the case, a
county attorney obtained a court order preventing further publication of The Saturday
Press. However, the Court struck down the Minnesota law, holding that it was “the
essence of censorship.” 100 The primary aim of the First Amendment’s free-press right,
according to the Court, was to prevent prior restraints of the press. The Court held that,
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except in very rare cases, censorship is unconstitutional. Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes said,
[W]e hold the statute, so far as it authorized the proceedings in this action
under clause (b) of section one, to be an infringement of the liberty of the
press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. We should add that this
decision rests upon the operation and effect of the statute, without regard
to the question of the truth of the charges contained in the particular
periodical. The fact that the public officers named in this case, and those
associated with the charges of official dereliction, may be deemed to be
impeccable cannot affect the conclusion that the statute imposes an
unconstitutional restraint upon publication. 101
While Hughes’s opinion strengthened the First Amendment protection against prior
restraint, it suggested such interference with publication would be acceptable under
certain circumstances:
[T]he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases. ‘When a
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as
men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right.’ (quoting Schenck v. United States). No one would
question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the
number and location of troops. On similar grounds, the primary
requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.
The security of the community life may be protected against incitements
to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government. 102
The fact that freedom of the press may be abused by “miscreant purveyors of scandal,” 103
Hughes said, does not make it any less necessary to protect the press from prior restraint.
In fact, a “more serious public evil” 104 would result if government officials could
determine which stories could and could not be published. Hughes also wrote that
freedom of the press, historically and constitutionally, has meant, “principally although
not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship” 105 (emphasis added).
Libel laws could still provide an avenue of redress for public officials, he wrote.
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Chief Justice Hughes’s opinion established certain exceptions to the prior restraint
rule. It is likely that, to secure the fifth vote for a majority in a Supreme Court with many
conservative justices, he had to agree to such a list. Nevertheless, since the Hughes
“exceptions” are not based on the facts of the Near case, they are considered dicta and
therefore should not be cited as precedent in subsequent cases.
The Court Considers the Rights of Students
During this era, the Court also began ruling on First Amendment cases directly
involving schools, teachers, and students. In the 1923 case of Meyer v. Nebraska, a
parochial school instructor was convicted under a state law that prohibited teaching
certain foreign languages in schools. 106 The Supreme Court held that the law violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 107 Specifically, the Court said that,
while the state has the authority to pass laws designed “to improve the quality of its
citizens, physically, mentally, and morally,” 108 the exercise of that authority cannot
unreasonably infringe on certain fundamental rights of individuals, including the right to
acquire knowledge. Meyer was one of the first cases to recognize and protect
“substantive due process” rights, including “the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 109 The decision in this case
also established that students possess at least some basic due process rights protected by
the Constitution—a principle that would become extremely important in future cases
involving schools.
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Just as the Court liberalized its stance toward speech protections for the general
population after World War I, the Court likewise underwent a rather fast expansion of
student speech rights. But initially, it looked like the Court was going to restrict such
rights. In a case that remained in effect for only three years, Minersville School District
v. Gobitis, decided in 1940, the Court granted public schools and state legislatures great
latitude to compel and regulate speech in the public schools. 110
Gobitis dealt with the expulsion of a Pennsylvania public school student and
Jehovah’s Witness who refused to salute the American flag. The Supreme Court upheld
the school’s requirement that students salute the flag, as well as the students’ expulsion
for violating that rule. The Court reasoned that:
The preciousness of the family relation, the authority and independence
which give dignity to parenthood, indeed the enjoyment of all freedom,
presuppose the kind of ordered society which is summarized by our flag.
A society which is dedicated to the preservation of these ultimate values of
civilization may in self-protection utilize the educational process for
inculcating those almost unconscious feelings which bind men together in
a comprehending loyalty, whatever may be their lesser differences and
difficulties. That is to say, the process may be utilized so long as men's
right to believe as they please, to win others to their way of belief, and
their right to assemble in their chosen places of worship for the devotional
ceremonies of their faith, are all fully respected. 111
Three years later, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette directly overruled
Gobitis on First Amendment grounds. Again, the Court considered the constitutionality
of a regulation requiring children in public schools to salute the American flag. 112 But
this time, the Court held that the regulation was unconstitutional, stating: “[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” 113 It is unusual for
the Supreme Court to directly overrule a precedent that was only three years old, which
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means the Court must have recognized how poorly it had addressed the issues raised in
the Gobitis case.
More than two decades after the Barnette ruling recognized some speech
protections for students, a 1968 case, Pickering v. Board of Education enhanced speech
rights for teachers. A high school teacher brought a lawsuit to challenge his termination
for writing a letter to the editor that criticized the local school board. 114 The Supreme
Court held that school officials violate the First Amendment when they terminate a public
school teacher for speaking out as a citizen on matters of public concern. 115 Pickering is
noteworthy for its substantial protections for speech by teachers (and public employees
more generally). Teachers’ rights are inevitably intertwined with students’ rights when it
comes to a student newspaper; many high school newspaper advisers are punished for
allowing students to publish journalistically important but controversial articles about the
school.
There is perhaps no Supreme Court case more important to student First
Amendment rights than the 1969 case Tinker v. Des Moines. Students at a public high
school and middle school, including 13-year-old Mary Beth Tinker, were suspended after
they wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. 116 The Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment rights of students can be infringed only when schools can
demonstrate that the speech may cause material and substantial disruption to the
operation of the school.
Importantly, the Court, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, stated that “First Amendment
rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are
available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers

35

shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.” 117
The First Amendment Versus Other Societal Interests
The Court’s expansion of student rights should be seen in the context of a general
enhancement of First Amendment rights taking place during the 1960s and beyond. If
Tinker was a high-water mark for student freedom, New York Times v. Sullivan, decided
five years earlier in 1964, was a high-water mark for journalists.
In the case, an elected commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama, who supervised
the police department, sued the newspaper after it published a full-page advertisement
criticizing police treatment of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and other civil rights activists.
Perhaps the most significant holding to come out of the Sullivan case is the substantial
protection the Court granted to the press when defending defamation claims. Under
Alabama libel law, the plaintiff was not required to prove that the editorial content at
issue was false, but merely that it tended to “injure” a person or bring him “into public
contempt.” 118 The Court held that, as applied to a public official, the law placed an
unconstitutional burden on the freedom of the press: “Raising as it does the possibility
that a good-faith critic of government will be penalized for his criticism, the proposition
relied on by the Alabama courts strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected
area of free expression.” 119 In the end, the Court established a new First Amendment
test, protecting the right to criticize public officials from defamation claims, unless the
plaintiff “proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” 120
New York Times Co. v. United States seven years later was a similarly important
case for press freedom, although not as strong an endorsement of First Amendment rights
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as the Sullivan case. New York Times v. U.S., commonly referred to as the “Pentagon
Papers” case, involved the government’s request for an injunction against the New York
Times’s and Washington Post’s publication of the contents of a classified study regarding
the Vietnam War. 121 In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion supported by six justices, the
Court held that the government did not meet its burden of showing justification for the
imposition of a prior restraint of expression. 122 Like Near v. Minnesota, this case made
clear that there is a heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of prior
restraints, even in cases involving national security. Courts and scholars continue to
debate today how widely the Supreme Court in this case left the door open for prior
restraints, or prosecutions of journalists, when the government claims serious threat to
national security.
The Question of Press Privilege
In the 1972 Supreme Court decision Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court had a chance
to recognize special privileges for members of the press. However, the Court refused to
uphold the right of journalists to keep sources confidential when the journalist has
witnessed a crime and has been called before a grand jury. Notably, five of the nine
justices were prepared to recognize certain special rights for journalists. Justice Potter
Stewart wrote the opinion for the four dissenting Justices:
The Court's crabbed view of the First Amendment reflects a disturbing
insensitivity to the critical role of an independent press in our society. The
question whether a reporter has a constitutional right to a confidential
relationship with his source is of first impression here, but the principles
that should guide our decision are as basic as any to be found in the
Constitution. While Mr. Justice Powell’s enigmatic concurring opinion
gives some hope of a more flexible view in the future, the Court in these
cases holds that a newsman has no First Amendment right to protect his
sources when called before a grand jury. The Court thus invites state and
federal authorities to undermine the historic independence of the press by
attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of
37

government. Not only will this decision impair performance of the press'
constitutionally protected functions, but it will, I am convinced, in the long
run, harm rather than help the administration of justice. 123
The “enigmatic” concurring opinion of Justice Lewis Powell, referred to here by Stewart,
said the following:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to
criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal
interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way
of adjudicating such questions. 124
In other words, a majority of the Court’s members were prepared to find some kind of
privilege for journalists—thus recognizing the right to keep sources confidential in some
circumstances. The Branzburg Court stated in dicta that “news gathering is not without
its First Amendment protections.” 125 Although courts routinely limited some means of
newsgathering, such as the use of hidden cameras, 126 the press was still considered to
have a right to use the “indispensible tools” of reporting. 127
The Branzburg case could hardly have had a worse set of facts on which to base
such an important decision as to whether reporters have a right to keep sources
confidential. Branzburg witnessed the manufacturing of illegal drugs, and Justice Byron
White concluded that he had to testify about what and whom he saw, just like any witness
to a crime.
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided the case of Nixon v. Warner
Communications, which addressed the common-law right of access to judicial records. 128
After the criminal trial of several of President Nixon’s former advisors, television
networks and others requested access to the certain tapes of conversations with the
president in his offices. The Supreme Court recognized a common-law right of access to
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judicial records: “It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to
inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and
documents.” However, the Court also said that the right of access is not absolute.
Decisions concerning access are left to the discretion of the trial court, and, in this case,
the trial court did not err in deciding not to release the tapes. 129 Ruling on statutory
grounds, the Court held that the Presidential Recordings Act controls the procedure for
releasing the tapes to the public. The Court wrote:
The release of the tapes is not required by the First Amendment guarantee
of freedom of the press. The question here is not whether the press must
be permitted access to public information to which the public generally
has access, but whether the tapes, to which the public has never had
physical access, must be made available for copying. 130
Despite the restrictions mentioned above, this case is nevertheless notable for recognizing
the general common-law right to inspect and copy judicial records, a right which student
journalists continue to enjoy today.
The Supreme Court recognized a common-law right of access to judicial records.
A common-law right refers to principles that emerge through court decisions or the
“custom” of a community over time. Such rights are not established by statutes. Thus,
they are likely to be less defined and may emerge through court rulings that are not
always consistent. Nevertheless, if a judge finds that common-law rights exist through
long practice or because they are in the public interest, such rights have the same force of
law as other types of judicial decisions. But if the decision identifying a common-law
right is not grounded in constitutional law (where the judge based the decision on a
provision in the federal or a state constitution), a legislature can modify such a right.
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Common-law rights are important to our legal system. Legislative bodies cannot
enact laws that cover all circumstances. Courts must be able to identify rights that are
neither explicitly granted by constitutions nor established through statutes.
In 1978, the Supreme Court distanced itself even further from the idea of special
press privileges. In Hutchins v. KQED, a television station obtained a court injunction
requiring a prison director to allow press access to areas of the prison from which reports
of abuse had stemmed. The Supreme Court overruled the decision, siding with the prison
director and holding that the press had no right to inspect public prisons or jails or to
interview inmates. 131 In a decision with far-reaching implications, the majority asserted
that there is “no right of access to government information or sources of information
within the government’s control.” 132 The justices argued that while the media play an
important role as the “eyes and ears of the public,” they are “no substitute for or an
adjunct of government and like the courts, they are ‘ill equipped’ to deal with problems
of prison administration.” 133 They reasoned that allowing the press access to the prison
and prisoners, to report on allegations of prisoner abuse and sub-par living conditions,
would “confuse the role of the media with that of government.” 134 The majority took a
very narrow reading of prior cases, interpreting them as providing a right to publish
information, but not a right to special access to government information it hopes to
publish. 135
The three justices who dissented to that opinion voiced strong objections to this
view. Stewart again argued for press privilege, writing that while he agreed that the Press
Clause of the First Amendment provides no special right of access to government
facilities, the press has “equal” access to such facilities as the public and that this should
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be interpreted with “more flexibility to accommodate practical distinctions between the
press and the general public.” 136 He wrote that the TV station was “clearly entitled to
some form of preliminary injunctive relief” from the prison director’s restrictions on
press access. He thought that the trial judge’s injunction went too far in allowing press
access to areas of the prison not open to public inspection. 137
The Court continued to accept First Amendment cases and had the opportunity to
refine the extent to which journalists are entitled to protection from libel suits. The 1974
case of Gertz v. Welch involves questions about the reach of First Amendment
protections for speech about private persons. 138 In New York Times v. Sullivan and later
cases, the Court said that “actual malice” must be shown before an individual or media
outlet can be held liable for false speech about public officials and public figures. In
Gertz, the Supreme Court held that states could—consistent with the First Amendment—
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster
of defamatory statements regarding a private individual. 139 There are limits, however.
The Court eliminated the possibility that innocent error with no fault involved could form
the basis of a libel suit. A plaintiff—even one who is a private person—must show at
least negligence to prevail at trial and on appeal. And the court held that states cannot
permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages without requiring a showing proof of
actual malice. 140 Like New York Times v. Sullivan, Gertz is noteworthy because it
identified contours of the constitutional limitations on state defamation laws.
Although Gertz addressed a plaintiff that the Court considered a private figure, it
is important to note that there is not a bright line between public figures and private
persons. First, the Court identified two types of public figures: All-purpose public
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figures and limited-purpose public figures. All-purpose public figures are individuals in
“positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figure for
all purposes. … They invite attention and comment.” 141 This category includes movie
stars, elite professional athletes, and the heads of major corporations. Limited-purpose
public figures are people who are not particularly well known, but who have “thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved.” 142 The actual malice standard applies broadly to
statements concerning all-purpose purpose public figures. For limited-purpose public
figures, the actual malice standard applies only to subject matter related to the
controversy in question or to the field in which the individual is prominent, not to the
person’s entire life.
In libel suits, one of the key issues is often whether someone is a public figure or
a private person. It is an extremely important part of any libel case because the public
figure’s burden of proving actual malice is much greater than that of a private person.
Intolerance for Prior Restraint
In the 1976 case of Nebraska Press Association v. Judge Stuart, the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a gag order restraining the press from publishing
accounts of confessions made by the accused in a mass murder case. 143 The defendant
confessed to the sheriff at the jail, and the trial judge ordered the reporters present not to
report the confession until a jury was seated. The Supreme Court had to decide whether
the judge’s gag order on the press was permitted by the First Amendment. The Court
held that, although in some cases a gag order may be imposed when necessary to ensure
that a defendant is afforded the right to a fair trial, the specific order here was invalid as a
prior restraint because the trial judge did not sufficiently consider other less restrictive
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measures. 144 This case is another notable example of the Supreme Court’s aversion to
prior restraints of speech.
The Court Grapples with Employee Rights
In the 1983 case of Connick v. Myers, a government employee brought a civil
rights action alleging that her employment was terminated because she exercised her
constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. 145 The employee, who was slated to be
transferred to another office and who objected to the transfer, distributed a questionnaire
to co-workers to research what others thought of how transfers were handled in the
office. After distributing the questionnaire, she was terminated for refusing to accept the
transfer and because distributing the questionnaire was considered an act of
insubordination. The Court held that the employee’s discharge did not offend the First
Amendment because the questionnaire was not speech on a matter of public concern.
Instead, it concerned matters only of the employee’s private interest. The Court said:
When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government
officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without
intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.
Perhaps the government employer’s dismissal of the worker may not be
fair, but ordinary dismissals from government service which violate no
fixed tenure or applicable statute or regulation are not subject to judicial
review even if the reasons for the dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or
unreasonable. 146
In dicta, the court also noted, “While as a matter of good judgment, public officials
should be receptive to constructive criticism offered by their employees, the First
Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee
complaints over internal office affairs.” 147
The Court’s decision in this matter establishes some of the constraints on speech
that are allowable in the government employment context. To understand these
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constraints, it is important to note that the Supreme Court’s analysis turned on the fact
that “the focus of the [employee’s] questions [was] not to evaluate the performance of the
office but rather to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her
superiors.” 148
The Limits of High School Student Speech
In the 1986 Supreme Court case Bethel School District v. Fraser (another case
involving student speech), a high school student was suspended for delivering a sexually
suggestive speech to the student body in which he nominated his fellow classmate for an
elective school office. 149 The Supreme Court said that the suspension did not violate the
student’s free speech rights. Explaining why this case was different from Tinker, the
Court said:
Unlike the sanctions imposed on the students wearing armbands in Tinker,
the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any political
viewpoint. The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials
from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as
respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational mission. A
high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit
monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage
students. Accordingly, it was perfectly appropriate for the school to
disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and
lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of
public school education. 150
A Supreme Court case held in even lower regard than Bethel (by student free
speech advocates) is the 1988 case Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier. In Hazelwood, the Supreme
Court again considered what protections the First Amendment provides for student
speech—but this time the context was student journalism. 151 A high school principal
removed two articles in the school paper that he believed demonstrated poor journalism
and were inappropriate for a high school audience. The authors of those articles claimed
a violation of their First Amendment rights and sued. The Supreme Court said that a
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school can impose restrictions on student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as its actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns
and the school has not created a public forum (a place or publication open either by
policy or practice to all expression).
Looking at the facts before it, the Court found that the principal:
could reasonably have concluded that the students who had written and
edited these articles had not sufficiently mastered those portions of the
Journalism II curriculum that pertained to the treatment of controversial
issues and personal attacks, the need to protect the privacy of individuals
whose most intimate concerns are to be revealed in the newspaper, and
“the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions imposed upon journalists within
[a] school community” that includes adolescent subjects and readers. 152
There are two basic justifications underlying the Supreme Court’s decision to
allow greater speech controls in this setting. First, the Court held, “[t]he question
whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech…is
different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively
to promote particular student speech.” 153 This is true because “[t]he former question
addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to
occur on the school premises…[while] [t]he latter question concerns educators’ authority
over school-sponsored…expressive activities…” 154 Second, the Supreme Court has
noted additional concerns: (1) preserving the ability to educate, (2) considering the
relative maturity of students, and (3) recognizing the possibility that the views of students
will be erroneously attributed to the school. As the Court explained:
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form of
student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the
activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to
material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the
views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the
school. 155
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Courts have long held that young people are not entitled to the same First
Amendment protection as adults. An example would be sexually graphic material, which
the courts have consistently held can be kept away from young people even though adults
have a right to see such material. 156 The existence of different First Amendment
standards for adults and children makes it more challenging for courts and legislatures to
establish standards for student expression. Judges and law-making bodies cannot simply
apply the First Amendment rights that adults enjoy, but must instead determine how
much freedom should be given to those who may not be mature enough to handle it
responsibly. There have always been certain limitations on First Amendment rights. The
courts seem to be saying that for young people, these limitations are best viewed through
the lens of responsible citizenship.
Although Hazelwood has been denounced by supporters of the First Amendment,
there are times when it is appropriate for a student media advisor or even a principal to
refuse to publish articles. The difficulty is recognizing when a principal is blocking an
article (1) because it is embarrassing, or (2) because there are legitimate journalistic
reasons for preventing publication. Of course, principals do not usually have a
journalism background and may not recognize good or bad journalism when they see it.
The Rights of College Students
A question that the Hazelwood Court explicitly declined to answer is whether
Hazelwood would apply in a university setting in a similar fashion to the way it applies to
a high school. 157 In Hosty v. Carter (which will be examined in detail in Chapter 4 of the
dissertation), the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit answered this
question in the affirmative for courts within its circuit, holding that Hazelwood is the
“starting point” for an analysis of regulations on a college student periodical. 158
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Although technically Hosty applies only to the states in the Seventh Circuit—Indiana,
Illinois, and Wisconsin—judges in other jurisdictions have been persuaded that Judge
Easterbrook’s analysis should be applied to their cases.
The Seventh Circuit’s Hosty decision sent shock waves through the student
newspaper community, with many First Amendment advocates fearing a domino effect of
further free-speech setbacks. However, it is important to note that there is a postHazelwood (but pre-Hosty) Supreme Court case that shows strong support for free speech
on college campuses, and it happened to involve a student newspaper. In the 1995 case
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the publishers of a student
newspaper with a Christian editorial viewpoint sued the University of Virginia,
challenging the denial of funds from a student activities fund to pay printing costs of
publications of student groups. 159 The justification for the denial of funds was made on
the basis a university policy that limited the use of funds for “religious organizations.” 160
The students alleged that the university denied their right to free speech by discriminating
against the content they wished to publish. The Supreme Court held that the denial of
funding amounted to viewpoint discrimination. 161 Rejecting claims that the university’s
policy was not discriminatory (because it denied funding to all religious organizations),
the Court said that the exclusion of several views on an issue is just as offensive to the
First Amendment as the exclusion of one. The Court also said that scarce resources
cannot justify viewpoint discrimination: It is the state’s responsibility to allocate scarce
resources on an acceptable neutral principle. 162 Accordingly, the Court held that the
University’s decision denied the students’ right of free speech.
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Drug-Related Messages
The 2000s saw a case that complicates the question of how far a school’s power
stretches in the regulation of student speech. Is the power confined to school property?
Or does it reach school-sponsored events off school property? The facts underlying the
case of Morse v. Frederick are memorable: A student was disciplined for holding up a
banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at an off-campus, school-sponsored event. 163
(The event was held during normal school hours, and teachers were present. 164) The
student challenged his suspension as a violation of his First Amendment rights. The
Supreme Court upheld the school’s discipline of the student. Specifically, the Court said:
It was reasonable for [the principal] to conclude that the banner promoted
illegal drug use—in violation of established school policy—and that
failing to act would send a powerful message to the students in her charge,
including Frederick, about how serious the school was about the dangers
of illegal drug use. The First Amendment does not require schools to
tolerate at school events student expression that contributes to those
dangers. 165
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer questioned how far the Court’s
reasoning could extend, wondering whether the Court would support punishing the
student for flying a “WINE SiPs 4 JESUS” banner—which could quite reasonably be
construed either as a protected religious message or as a pro-alcohol message.” 166
Instead of directly addressing the limits of school officials’ authority to punish
off-campus speech in Morse, the Court created a fact-specific exception to free speech
when it comes to messages that promote illegal drug use at a school-sponsored activity.
Legal scholars argue that “Morse effectively expanded the school’s authority to punish
student expression” to off-campus speech with “ramifications for speech on the Internet”
because the speech at issue in Morse did not cause any material or substantial disruption
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to the school or to the rights of others, occurred at a public event off campus, and could
not reasonably be seen to bear the school’s imprimatur. 167
The pre-Morse trend was toward limiting school officials’ authority over offcampus speech. 168 However, Morse seemed to give school officials more discretion to
punish speech promoting drug use when it originates or is available off campus. Because
the content of the speech in Morse was drug-related—and the Court based its decision on
the need for school officials to discourage such advocacy—the Morse decision has not
been widely used to strike down controversial expression. For example, in the 2009 case
B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 School District, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit declined to apply Morse because the speech in Farmington did not involve
illegal drug use, but rather involved racism and the use of the Confederate flag. Thus, the
court applied the Tinker standard instead. 169
The next chapter will discuss federal cases at the K-12 level. In the 1960s, cases
such as Burnside v. Byars and Zucker v. Panitz strengthened protections for student
expression. In the 1980s, the pendulum began to swing in the other direction, toward
diminished rights for students, in cases such as Romano v. Harrington and Poling v.
Murphy. The last decade of the 20th century and first decade of the 21st century saw a
nationwide struggle over school districts’ free-speech policies, particularly in light of
growing problems such as gang speech and bullying. However, despite widespread
concern about these issues, courts nevertheless consistently displayed their distaste for
vague policies. The next chapter also explores the disagreement among lower federal
courts about the circumstances under which off-campus speech may be punished by
school officials.
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CHAPTER THREE:
FEDERAL CASES AT THE K-12 LEVEL
Federal Court Disagreement
It is well understood that in many circumstances, school officials have the
authority to limit student speech on their campuses and in school-sponsored events and
publications. However, the line between school administrators’ authority to carry out a
school’s educational mission and students’ constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom
of speech is often hard to draw, and federal district and circuit courts have struggled to
agree on the boundaries. The school’s policies must be written with precision and must
not interfere with any more First Amendment protection than is necessary. As C. Eric
Wood noted in the law review article “Learning on the Razor’s Edge,” “a broad and
encompassing speech restriction may be struck down on overbreadth or vagueness
grounds. Conversely, a narrow and specific speech restriction may be struck down on
viewpoint discrimination grounds. The difficulty of successfully balancing these
competing considerations cannot be underestimated.” 170
Growth of Student Rights in the 1960s
Three years before the Supreme Court solidified a baseline standard of First
Amendment rights for students in the 1969 Tinker v. Des Moines decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (with jurisdiction over Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas), made a leap forward with regard to student rights in Burnside v.
Byars. 171 Students at a Mississippi high school obtained “freedom buttons” from a local
civil rights organization and began wearing and distributing them at school. 172 The local
board of education enacted a regulation that banned the wearing and distribution of the
buttons, which said, “One Man One Vote.” 173 The students brought a civil rights action,
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requesting a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of the regulation. The district
court denied the injunction, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the affidavits and
testimony before the district court revealed that the student protest posed no interference
with educational activity and did not support a conclusion that there was a commotion or
that the buttons distracted the students. The court wrote:
We wish to make it quite clear that we do not applaud any attempt to
undermine the authority of the school. We support all efforts made by the
school to fashion reasonable regulations for the conduct of their students
and enforcement of the punishment incurred when such regulations are
violated. Obedience to duly constituted authority is a valuable tool, and
respect for those in authority must be instilled in our young people. But,
with all of this in mind, we must also emphasize that school officials
cannot ignore expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to
contend. 174
This case may have influenced the language for Tinker’s “material and
substantial” disruption test adopted three years later by the Supreme Court. The Burnside
court wrote:
[Public school officials] cannot infringe on their students’ right to free and
unrestricted expression as guaranteed to them under the First Amendment
to the Constitution, where the exercise of such rights in the school
buildings and school rooms do not materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school (emphasis added). 175
The Burnside opinion signaled the willingness of the courts to protect student rights when
the exercise of such rights do not interfere with the operations of the school. The
willingness of the courts to limit the authority of school officials under some
circumstances—as reflected in Burnside and Tinker—was an important development in
terms of balancing the First Amendment rights of students with the needs of school
officials to maintain order.
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Three months after the Supreme Court’s Tinker decision in 1969, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York applied the Tinker standard to
student media, apparently the first time a federal district court had done so. 176 In Zucker
v. Panitz, a group of students at New Rochelle High School formed a club called Student
Committee Against the War in Vietnam, and sought to publish an advertisement in the
school newspaper stating their opposition to the war. The text of the advertisement said,
“The United States government is pursuing a policy in Viet Nam which is both repugnant
to moral and international law and dangerous to the future of humanity. We can stop it.
We must stop it.”177 The principal told the student newspaper editor not to publish the
advertisement, and two parents brought suit on behalf of their children. In his ruling,
District Judge Charles Miller Metzner sided with the students. He said that the
defendants’ main argument was that the war is “not a school-related activity” and
therefore not appropriate for discussion within the school newspaper. The defendants
also claimed that advertising in the newspaper, The Huguenot Herald, was limited to
purely commercial messages. In an energetic defense of student press rights, Judge
Metzner wrote:
If the Huguenot Herald’s contents were truly as flaccid as the defendants’
argument implies, it would indeed be a sterile publication. Furthermore, its
function as an educational device surely could not be served if such were
the content of the paper. However, it is clear that the newspaper is more
than a mere activity time and place sheet. The factual core of defendants’
argument falls with a perusal of the newspapers submitted to the court.
They illustrate that the newspaper is being used as a communications
media [sic] regarding controversial topics and that the teaching of
journalism includes dissemination of such ideas. Such a school paper is
truly an educational device. 178
Metzner noted that the school paper does appear to be open to the free expression
of ideas in both the news and editorial sections. Citing Tinker, the judge wrote that
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abridging such a forum would be “patently unfair in light of the free speech doctrine.” 179
The judge concluded his opinion with a stern lecture aimed at those who would attempt
to silence the opinions of students:
This lawsuit arises at a time when many in the educational community
oppose the tactics of the young in securing a political voice. It would be
both incongruous and dangerous for this court to hold that students who
wish to express their views on matters intimately related to them, through
traditionally accepted nondisruptive modes of communication, may be
precluded from doing so by that same adult community. 180
With its specific defense of student press rights, the Zucker decision showed that courts
could apply Tinker as a strong bulwark against unwarranted administrative censorship of
student media in public schools.
The 1970s: Schools Show Discomfort With Student Freedom
Protections for free speech and free expression continued their evolution in the
1976 case Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District. In this case, high school
students in Ohio brought a class action suit against a city school district, the school board,
and the superintendent. The students alleged that the defendants had violated their First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights by (1) refusing to approve certain books as texts or
library books, (2) ordering the removal of certain books, and (3) issuing regulations
prohibiting teacher and student discussions concerning the removed books. 181 After the
district court dismissed most of the students’ claims, the Sixth Circuit (with jurisdiction
over Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) reversed in part. The court held that the
removal of the books based on their content violated the students’ First Amendment
rights. The Court said, “If one of the English teachers considered Joseph Heller’s Catch
22 to be one of the more important modern American novels (as, indeed, at least one did),
we assume that no one would dispute that the First Amendment’s protection of academic

57

freedom would protect both his right to say so in class and his students’ right to hear him
and to find and read the book.” 182 This decision illustrates the court system’s aversion to
viewpoint discrimination, as well as its priority in placing the right to acquire knowledge
above a particular constituency’s discomfort with certain points of view. Government
entities, including schools, may impose reasonable regulations over the use of their
facilities, while respecting the First Amendment rights of students. What schools cannot
do is discriminate on the basis of the students’ views. For example, principals should not
permit the publication of an article that praises the school while rejecting one that
criticizes it.
The 1977 case Gambino v. Fairfax County School Board further solidified student
press rights (at least in the Fourth Circuit, with jurisdiction over Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia). Although cultural attitudes
toward topics such as sex began to change in the 1960s, many schools were still
uncomfortable with open discussions of sexual topics in the 1970s—just as many schools
are still concerned about discussions of such topics today. In Gambino, student editors of
a school-sponsored newspaper in Virginia surveyed students on sexual activity,
discovering that many students took no precautions to avoid pregnancy. 183 Their news
story included information about the availability and effectiveness of certain forms of
birth control. The school principal said the story violated a school policy prohibiting the
teaching of sex education. However, the federal district court and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sided with the students. The school had argued that the
student newspaper was not a public forum, but an “in-house organ of the school system,
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funded and sponsored by the Board [of Education].” 184 However, the Fourth Circuit
Court disagreed:
Upon considering the Board’s general policy toward student publications,
as well as past articles in The Farm News, the district court found that the
newspaper was established as a public forum for student expression, and
therefore is subject to first amendment protection. It also concluded that
the students are not a captive audience merely because of their compulsory
attendance at the school. Finally, the court concluded that because the
newspaper was established as a public forum and not as an official
publication, it cannot be viewed as part of the curriculum; accordingly, the
general power of the Board to regulate course content does not apply. 185
In his dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Donald Russell echoed the sentiments of earlier
generations, which still hold sway over many school boards in certain areas of the
country today—i.e., that any discussion of sex is harmful because it could potentially lead
to promiscuity.
A school administration certainly has a legitimate concern in eliminating
from its curriculum material which may reasonably be considered as
conducive to immorality and not appropriate to proper academic
education… 186
Judge Russell also did not understand how school officials could forbid its
teachers from discussing sex education but could be “powerless” to forbid its pupils from
doing the same thing in a school-funded publication. 187 Nevertheless, the students’ right
to discuss topics of their own choosing, even in a school publication, carried the day in
this case.
Foreshadowing the Debate Over Off-Campus Speech
As the preceding case illustrates, by the late 1970s (the decade following Tinker),
students had some clearly established protections for expression at school, even if certain
officials were uncomfortable with those protections. In other words, the courts had
established limits to the ability of school officials to punish or censor in the
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circumstances raised by the facts of the cases discussed above. However, the debate over
a school’s power to punish students’ speech off campus was only beginning. In 1986, in
Klein v. Smith, a student gave a teacher a crude gesture (a raised middle finger) at a
restaurant parking lot after school hours. The United States District Court in Maine
rejected the school’s claim that the gesture undermined the teacher’s ability to discipline
students at school. 188 Even though the Klein case involved in-person, off-campus
interaction, the Klein court’s language would suggest that online comments about a
teacher would also be protected:
The student was not engaged in any school activity or associated in any
way with school premises or his role as a student. Any possible connection
between his act of “giving the finger” to a person who happens to be one
of his teachers and the proper and orderly operation of the school's
activities is, on the record here made, far too attenuated to support
discipline against Klein for violating the rule prohibiting vulgar or
discourteous conduct toward a teacher. 189
The court continued:
The public interest may be thought to be best served if schools and
teachers practice the historical orthodoxies of our political freedom while
they preach the temporally transitory orthodoxies of “taste.” They may
legitimately, and should, seek to inculcate the latter, but they may not, in
the effort to do so, transgress upon the former. In the final analysis, under
our Constitution individual liberty of expression must be accorded its day
even at the expense of the promotion of aesthetic sophistication. 190
However, a crude statement or gesture in a parking lot is fleeting; a crude
comment on a website is likely to be permanent. Decades later, in the age of the Internet,
the line of permissibility beyond which schools can punish students for the website
equivalent of a “middle finger in an off-campus parking lot” would become more
complicated than it was at the time of Klein. Furthermore, Klein foreshadowed another
problem that would become increasingly commonplace in public schools: the anger of a
teacher or other school authority who feels he or she has been disrespected by students.
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Klein foreshadowed the upcoming problems of the Internet era, when personal insults
would become amplified through the Internet’s widespread availability, permanence, and
easy accessibility both on and off campus.
Initial Rejection of Hazelwood
In 1988, the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision, discussed in the preceding
chapter, caused a stir among free speech advocates who feared a domino effect of federal
court rulings curtailing student and teacher expression rights. However, Romano v.
Harrington, decided one year after Hazelwood, illustrated that such an outcome was not
inevitable. In Romano, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York had an opportunity to apply Hazelwood but declined. A tenured English teacher at
a New York public high school was terminated from his position as advisor to the student
newspaper (but not from his full-time English teaching position) after the newspaper
published an editorial arguing against creating a federal holiday for Martin Luther King,
Jr. 191 When he brought suit under the First Amendment, the school filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that Hazelwood granted the school extensive editorial control over
student newspapers. Writing for the court, District Judge Raymond Dearie disagreed,
saying:
If Harrington’s conduct constituted unconstitutional reprisal for the
exercise of First Amendment rights, such conduct may chill another
advisor’s willingness to give student writers the level of constitutional
freedom to which they are entitled and may circumscribe the student
editors’ decisions regarding what to publish because of their concerns of
indirect retaliation against their advisor or direct retaliation against a
member of the student body. The Court finds that it would be anomalous
to conclude that defendants can avoid plaintiff’s allegations on the ground
that the actual injury in this case was inflicted on the faculty advisor rather
than on the students directly. 192
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Dearie’s opinion is important not only for its insight into the chilling effect of
censorship, but also for its articulation of the relationship between student and advisor,
especially in cases in which students may be afraid to express certain viewpoints out of a
concern for a retaliation against their teacher or advisor.
Speech Tightly Regulated at Assemblies
Although courts have often disagreed about how much regulation is permissible
when it comes to student media, courts have mostly approved of a school’s ability to
regulate what happens at a school assembly or ceremony. In the 1989 case Poling v.
Murphy, a high school student in Tennessee filed suit against school administrators and
the local board of education, alleging that the defendants had violated his First
Amendment rights by removing him from a school election after he made what school
authorities considered inappropriate remarks during a school assembly. 193 After making
a tasteless joke about “a baby in a trashbag,” the student said:
I just made you laugh at something incredibly sick. If I can do this to you,
then the administration could probably take advantage of you also. For
example, have you noticed that each year there are less and less
assemblies? How many of you would like at least a chance at open
campus? Would you like a better chance of having the prom in Johnson
City? Is there something in this school you would like changed? The
administration plays tricks with your mind and they hope you won't
notice. Because of the administration's iron grip, our school has been kept
behind other schools like Science Hill. If you want to break this grip, vote
for me for president. I can try to bring back student rights that you have
missed and maybe get things that you always wanted. All you have to do
is vote for me, Dean Poling! 194
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee granted
summary judgment in favor of school officials, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that the defendants had the right to restrict speech at the school
assembly because the election itself and the election assembly were school-sponsored
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activities. The case is noteworthy for its holding that “[t]he art of stating one’s views
without indulging in personalities and without unnecessarily hurting the feelings of others
surely has a legitimate place in any high school curriculum” and is thus a “legitimate
pedagogical concern.” 195 This decision is also surprising because—even though this was
just a student election—political speech has always enjoyed substantial First Amendment
protection. In fact, Judge Merritt, in his dissent, declared that the court applied the wrong
First Amendment test and therefore reached the wrong result. Citing Barnette and
Tinker, Merritt said:
The applicable First Amendment cases hold that when a high school
student engages in political or “pure speech” in a school forum the student
is protected by the First Amendment under a test substantially similar to
that for adults. … Political speech of students that does not threaten to
foment “substantial disorder,” “disruption” or “invasion of privacy” is still
protected under the First Amendment. Because the majority has used the
wrong standard, it has reached the wrong result. There is no evidence in
this case of “substantial disorder,” “disruption” or “invasion of privacy.”
Dean Poling's speech to 800 students at the high school assembly was
“political speech,” pure and simple. It was not a vulgar speech like the one
found unprotected in Bethel or a gross invasion of the right of privacy of
an unwed, pregnant student as in Hazelwood. Poling was running for
president of the student body of his school. He made a tough populist
speech, short but not sweet. His main point was this: If you want to break
the iron grip of this school, vote for me for President. I can try to bring
back student rights that you have missed and maybe get things that you
have always wanted. All you have to do is vote for me, Dean Poling. His
fellow students from the hills and hollows of rural upper East Tennessee
stood and cheered, but they were not disruptive. Although critical of the
administration and of one particular teacher, the speech cannot be
classified as one which “materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at
513, 89 S.Ct. at 740. If the school administration can silence a student
criticizing it for being narrow minded and authoritarian, how can students
engage in political dialogue with their educators about their education? 196
However, Merritt’s opinion did not carry the day; instead, courts came to the
opposite conclusion starting in 1986 when the majority opinion in Poling was adopted by
courts in other jurisdictions. In Bethel School District v. Fraser, the U.S. Supreme Court
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upheld a student’s suspension after he gave a speech at a school assembly in support of a
candidate for student body president that contained sexual innuendo. Now decades later,
courts often apply Fraser to such cases. For example, in 2009, a federal district court in
Colorado applied Fraser in Corder v. Lewis Palmer School District, in which a principal
required approval for a high school valedictorian’s speech prior to the graduation
ceremony. 197 When the student gave a different speech than that which was approved,
the principal required her to publicly apologize. The Tenth Circuit (with jurisdiction over
Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming) determined that the
school district did not violate the student’s free speech rights by requiring the review of
the content of her speech prior to its presentation or by compelling her apology.
Symbolic Expression Continues to Be Protected
In a 1992 case with echoes of both Tinker and Burnside, sons and daughters of
striking teachers wore “scab” stickers to an Oregon public school (the word “scab”
referring to a worker who accepted employment or replaced a union worker during a
strike). The stickers also contained various pro-union and pro-teacher slogans. 198 When
their school ordered the students to remove the stickers, the students brought suit, arguing
the requirement violated their rights under the First Amendment. In Chandler v.
McMinnville School District, the district court dismissed the case, but the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (with jurisdiction over Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington) reversed and remanded. The Court
of Appeals held that the “scab” buttons were improperly suppressed where nothing in the
complaint or in the district court’s analysis substantiated the conclusion that such buttons
were inherently disruptive. The case, like the Tinker and Burnside cases, illustrates the
court system’s aversion to restricting students’ symbolic expression worn on clothing.
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The School Assembly/School Media Dichotomy
It is interesting that courts have granted school officials substantial discretion to
punish student speech at an assembly but have been less willing to curtail school
interference with student media. In contrast to the permanence of newspapers or even
buttons on clothing, speeches at school assemblies are usually fleeting—and this was
even more true in the days before students had smartphones with cameras that record
video. By examining cases involving student press rights, one immediately notices that
there is something about school assemblies that persuades courts to give school officials
more leeway to regulate and punish student speech. The fact that students are a captive
audience at a school-sponsored event could be a factor. Another factor could be that it is
done “live” and “in person” and school officials (and courts) think anything beyond
banal, innocuous statements could lead to a lack of respect for authority. In any case,
some comments made at school assemblies—which courts allowed to be punished—
would be protected by the First Amendment if communicated in some other way.
Distaste for Vague Policies
The last decade of the 20th century and first decade of the 21st century saw courts
around the country struggle over school districts’ free-speech policies, particularly in
light of growing problems such as gang speech and bullying. However, despite
widespread concern about these issues, courts nevertheless consistently displayed their
impatience for vague policies that give school officials too much discretion to ban or
punish disfavored speech. In Stephenson v. Davenport Community School District (a
1997 Iowa case), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (with jurisdiction over
Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota) found
a school’s anti-gang rules unconstitutionally vague. The Court said the rules “fail[ed] to
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provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct” and “allow[ed] school administrators and
local police unfettered discretion to decide what represents a gang symbol.” 199
In the 2001 Pennsylvania case Saxe v. State College Area School District, a
school district adopted an anti-harassment policy that broadly prohibited certain forms of
expression. 200 The policy defined harassment as follows:
Harassment means verbal or physical conduct based on one's actual or
perceived race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has the purpose or
effect of substantially interfering with a student's educational performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment. 201
Additionally, the policy included the following as examples of harassment:
Harassment can include any unwelcome verbal, written or physical
conduct which offends, denigrates or belittles an individual because of any
of the characteristics described above. Such conduct includes, but is not
limited to, unsolicited derogatory remarks, jokes, demeaning comments or
behaviors, slurs, mimicking, name calling, graffiti, innuendo, gestures,
physical contact, stalking, threatening, bullying, extorting or the display or
circulation of written material or pictures. 202
Several students brought suit, arguing that the policy was unconstitutional under
the First Amendment’s free speech clause. After the district court upheld the antidiscrimination policy by holding that the policy restricted only speech that was already
proscribed by state and federal law, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed and struck down the policy as overbroad, meaning that it displaced more First
Amendment protection than was necessary to accomplish the goal of the school’s
regulations. The fact that the policy may have only proscribed speech that would fall
within the scope of federal or state laws did not affect this holding.
Some may find it strange for the courts to place so much emphasis on whether the
school sponsored the assembly or the school newspaper. Yet, the argument that anyone
hearing a speech at an assembly or reading an article in the school newspaper will believe
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the content represents the official position of the school or has been approved by school
officials in advance is unconvincing. In looking for “objective standards” that help them
decide whether First Amendment rights have been violated, courts have placed too much
emphasis on whether the activity where the speech was disseminated was a schoolsponsored event. The U.S. Supreme Court followed exactly this logic in Morse v.
Frederick, in which the court seemed so focused on the event being sponsored by the
school that it overlooked the satirical and meaningless message on Frederick’s banner. 203
Courts may continue to draw this distinction rather than undertake the more difficult task
of determining the boundaries of First Amendment speech based on its content, rather
than the setting in which it is delivered or written.
In any case, because the policy in Saxe prohibited a substantial amount of nonvulgar, non-sponsored student speech and the policy’s restrictions were not necessary to
prevent substantial disruption or interference with the work of the school or the rights of
other students, the policy was overbroad under the Supreme Court’s Tinker standard.
Writing for the court, Judge Samuel Alito (who was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court
in 2006), said: “As subsequent federal cases have made clear, Tinker requires a specific
and significant fear of disruption, not just some remote apprehension of disturbance.” 204
Likewise, in 2008, in Gillman v. School Board for Holmes County, Florida, the district
court held that a school’s ban on “illegal organizations” and “secret societies” was
unconstitutionally vague. 205
The Challenge of Internet Speech
Can courts extend Tinker’s “material and substantial disruption” test to offcampus speech? Not only is the law unsettled on this question, but what is “on” or “off”
campus has also become more complicated in the age of the Internet. The 2001 case
67

Killion v. Franklin Regional School District illustrates the problem. In Killion, a student
in Pennsylvania wrote an email making fun of his coach, including remarks about his
coach’s genitals. The student sent the email to a friend but did not show it to anyone on
campus. Importantly, school computers were not used for either the creation or the
reading of the message. But later, a different student, who had been forwarded a copy of
the email on a home computer, printed out the email and brought it to school. The United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania said:
Although there is limited case law on the issue, courts considering speech
that occurs off school grounds have concluded (relying on Supreme Court
decisions) that school officials' authority over off-campus expression is
much more limited than expression on school grounds. 206
This language suggests that schools generally carry a heavier burden to punish
off-campus speech, compared to on-campus speech. However, this statement left
unanswered the question of whether the email in this case was on-campus speech or offcampus speech. Was it off-campus speech because it was created by a student on his
home computer after school hours? Or was it on-campus speech because a different
student printed it and brought it to school? The court did not directly answer that
question and decided to apply Tinker’s “material and substantial disruption” test.
In the court’s view, the email did not interfere with the school’s ability to
discipline its students.207 The court said: “[w]e cannot accept, without more, that the
childish and boorish antics of a minor could impair the administrators’ abilities to
discipline students and maintain control.” 208 Thus, the student’s suspension “violates the
First Amendment because defendants failed to satisfy Tinker's substantial disruption
test.” 209 With regard to the question of whether the email constituted on-campus or offcampus speech, the court indulged in the judicial equivalent of throwing up one’s hands:
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Although plaintiffs urge that a heightened standard applies because the
speech at issue occurred off school grounds, we need not resolve this
issue. The overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed student speech
(whether on or off campus) in accordance with Tinker. Further, because
the … list was brought on campus, albeit by an unknown person, Tinker
applies. 210
Some courts have found that Tinker extends to student speech generated off
campus but which the speaker distributed on campus. This theory is based on cases
involving independent student newspapers seeking distribution on or near campus. 211
Other courts have extended this principle to online blog posts, social networking profiles,
and websites devoted to school news, campus gossip, or parody of school topics or
officials, when a student showed it to fellow students or accessed the content on
campus. 212 In the 2008 law review article “Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age,”
Mary-Rose Papandrea wrote:
Most courts taking this sort of territorial approach make clear that it must
be the student-speaker himself—and not another pupil or school
administrator—who has accessed the speech at school or otherwise caused
the speech or a copy of it to physically appear on campus. 213
In 2002, in Coy v. Board of Education, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio held that Fraser did not apply to a website containing indecent language
when the school administration, at the time the student was expelled, had no evidence
that any other student viewed the student’s website. 214
This case brings up another issue: the tendency for a certain group of courts to
decide how much First Amendment protection certain speech should receive based on
whether students on campus have seen the speech. This leads down an uncertain road.
Where is the cutoff? What if one student saw it? Or 10? Or 20? Is there a number that
the courts should have in mind in deciding whether the speech was distributed on
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campus? This standard would seem problematic at best in the days of the Internet, when
text and other forms of media are available to everyone.
Court Sets Criteria for Limited Public Forum
In 2003, the same court (but a different judge) dealt with a case involving a
student newspaper. In Draudt v. Wooster City School District Board of Education, the
principal of Wooster High School in Ohio seized all copies of the December 20, 2002,
edition of the student newspaper. The issue contained an article addressing underage
drinking, specifically the alleged lenient punishments some student athletes received after
they were caught drinking. 215 Two students were identified by name in the article,
leading the principal and district superintendent to believe the article was “potentially
defamatory.” 216 The administrators also disputed other facts contained in the article. On
December 23, 2002, the Board issued the following statement:
The Wooster Blade, the district student newspaper, printed a story in the
latest edition that referred to two students by name and state [sic] that one
of the students “... openly admits to consuming alcohol at the event and,
like the five other violators, will receive community service as
punishment.” The article mentioned elsewhere that “the school ...
punished and convicted six ... students of drinking.” These statements are
entirely untrue and factually inaccurate. They are potentially defamatory
or libelous and may constitute a violation of law. 217
The District Court held that public or limited public forums are protected by the
Tinker-based standard, which requires proof that the censored material is either unlawful
or substantially disruptive. In contrast, non-public forum publications are subject to the
more administration-friendly Hazelwood standard, requiring only that the censorship be
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. The court held that the paper was a limited
public forum. Importantly, for the first time since Hazelwood, a court set out explicit
criteria for determining whether a school intended to create a limited public forum:
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The Supreme Court instructs courts to look at six factors: 1) whether the
students produced the newspaper as part of the high school curriculum; 2)
whether students receive credits and grades for completing the course; 3)
whether a member of the faculty oversaw the production; 4) whether the
school deviated from its policy of producing the paper as part of the
educational curriculum; 5) the degree of control the administration and the
faculty advisor exercise; and 6) applicable written policy statements of the
board. 218
A Rare Clear-Cut Case
First Amendment advocates often find themselves in the awkward position of
defending mean-spirited attacks by immature students—a position that has little public
support. Thus, First Amendment advocates are thankful when a case like 2004’s Dean v.
Utica Community Schools comes along, and advocates can passionately defend their
position. In 2004, Dean v. Utica provided a clear-cut example of the purpose of a student
newspaper and the limits of administrative censorship. In the case, students at a
Michigan high school attempted to publish a story in their student newspaper, the Arrow,
about a lawsuit filed against their school district alleging that diesel fumes from the
district’s bus garage constituted a nuisance and harmed the health of homeowners who
lived near the lot where the buses idled for extended periods of time. 219 The principal
forwarded a draft of the article to the superintendent, who told the principal to remove the
article. “The only reason given … for the removal of the article was that the district was
involved in litigation and it ‘would be inappropriate for the school newspaper to
comment on that.’” 220
When editor Katy Dean sought relief through a lawsuit, the court held that the
student newspaper was a limited public forum for purposes of free speech analysis, and
that the school district violated the free speech component of the First Amendment by
suppressing the article. 221 Furthermore, “The Arrow’s decision to publish an article on
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the … lawsuit was consistent with the traditions of the paper and the inherent nature of
newspaper journalism in a democracy.” 222 In a rousing defense of the importance of
student newspapers, and journalism in general, Judge Arthur Tarnow wrote:
The newspaper class at Utica High School is intended to teach journalism.
A core value of being a journalist is to understand the role of the press in a
free society. That role is to provide an independent source of information
so that a citizen can make informed decisions. It is often the case that this
core value of journalistic independence requires a journalist to question
authority rather than side with authority. Thus, if the role of the press in a
democratic society is to have any value, all journalists—including student
journalists—must be allowed to publish viewpoints contrary to those of
state authorities without intervention or censorship by the authorities
themselves. Without protection, the freedoms of speech and press are
meaningless and the press becomes a mere channel for official thought. 223
The court added that, even if the paper was a non-public forum to which the Hazelwood
standard applied, the court ruled that the censorship of the Arrow did not reasonably
relate to legitimate pedagogical concerns. The school district’s reasoning was even less
convincing in light of the fact that local newspapers had already published information
about the lawsuit.
Violent Threats Not Tolerated
Most cases are not as clear-cut as Dean v. Utica. If all censorship cases centered
on schools trying to suppress unflattering facts, courts would have a much easier time
deciding First Amendment cases. However, courts often have given schools leeway on
the Tinker standard when the speech includes threats of violence or might lead to
discipline problems in the school. Such was the case in a 2007 decision involving a
student in upstate New York. In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central
School District, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (with
jurisdiction over Connecticut, New York, and Vermont) found material and substantial
disruption to the school after an incident involving a student’s use of AOL Instant
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Messenger to send a message to friends. In this case, a student, after school hours and
using his own computer, had sent an animated icon to friends showing the teacher being
shot. 224 The court held that it was immaterial that the icon was clearly intended as a joke,
and therefore the school could punish the student for the illustration attached to the
messages. 225
Threats Versus Insults
Most courts have distinguished between cases such as Wisniewski, in which the
speech includes threats or references to violence against school officials, and cases
involving speech that merely disparages school officials. Some courts have adopted the
approach of allowing school officials to punish any speech whose audience is related to
the campus and which may reasonably be expected to come to the attention of school
officials. In one Connecticut case, Doninger v. Niehoff , decided in 2008, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals (with jurisdiction over Connecticut, New York, and Vermont)
affirmed a district court ruling that the school could punish a student for writing a blog
post expressing her frustration over the school’s decision to relocate a planned on-campus
music festival she had helped plan and encouraging her readers to call the school to
complain. 226 The district court in that case had held that the school could punish the
student under Fraser because the blog post called school officials “douchebags,” thereby
interfering with the school’s “‘highly appropriate function … to prohibit the use of vulgar
and offensive terms in public discourse.”’ 227 On appeal, the Second Circuit court refused
to address whether Fraser could apply to off-campus speech and resolved the case on
Tinker grounds, holding that it was foreseeable that her post would create a risk of
substantial disruption at the school because she had urged readers to call and complain. 228
(The outcome, of course, may have been different if she had not used the word
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“douchebags,” but had simply urged her readers to call and complain.) The Second
Circuit and other courts have used this “reasonably foreseeable” test to bring online
speech relating to schools under the “punitive jurisdiction” of school officials, meaning
school officials have the right to decide whether students can be punished for certain offcampus speech. 229
Schools Gain Power to Punish Off-Campus Speech
There is disagreement among lower courts about the circumstances under which
off-campus speech may be punished by school officials. However, as Doninger suggests,
there may be a growing trend toward expanding schools’ ability to punish behavior off
campus. The trend seems to favor schools’ interest in reaching outside the schoolyard to
punish students for behavior on the Internet, particularly when such off-campus online
speech negatively portrays school officials or becomes a topic of discussion among
students while at school. It is interesting to consider how much “discussion” at school is
too much. In other words, do courts want to base First Amendment rights of a speaker on
the reaction of some group of people or the intended audience? Such a standard might
result in the following absurdity: If students do not care about the message, then the
speaker receives full First Amendment rights. If the students energetically discuss it,
then First Amendment rights are limited.
While courts have consistently upheld school policies restricting student speech
on campus, particularly when the speech is expressed in school-sponsored forums, the
practice of regulating on-campus speech is a far cry from allowing school officials to
reach into students’ homes and punish them for wholly off-campus speech which school
officials find offensive or which they feel compelled to respond to in their capacity as
educators.
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Problems With School Intervention in Off-Campus Speech
Schools should not be the government authority responsible for dealing with
threatening or harassing speech that takes place wholly off campus. There are civil and
criminal legal remedies school officials may pursue if they feel harassed, defamed, or
threatened by anyone off campus—student or not. A school may decide to move a
student or a teacher to a different class as a result of such off-campus disputes; however,
it could be argued that this is a personnel issue rather than a discipline issue.
In sum, the risks to First Amendment rights are greatly increased when school
officials have the authority to punish students for off-campus speech. Although a
student’s off-campus speech may eventually finds its way on campus, school officials
should not be allowed to punish students for their private, off-campus conversations.
Regrettably, it is necessary sometimes for school officials to deal with social ills and
controversies that affect their campus community and to educate students about a variety
of issues that arise outside of school. If racial tensions are running high off campus, a
school official may choose to have an assembly promoting racial harmony. But that
same school official should not have the authority to punish a student for a racist remark
made on the student’s Facebook page after school hours and using the student’s personal
computer.
Setting the boundaries of appropriate student speech in day-to-day off-campus life
is the parents’ role. It is the parent, not the government or the school, who has the
primary authority and right to determine the values and norms expected of children in
their personal lives. It is the parents’ job to establish the child’s religion, morals, and
goals. Although the school plays an important part of teaching community-wide culture,
values and expectations, this role is diminished outside the schoolhouse gates. Granting
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school officials the authority to regulate off-campus student speech it considers offensive
or vulgar is an unacceptable intrusion on parental rights and an invasion of privacy of
students.
Division Grows Over What Counts as “On Campus”
The following two cases illustrate the inconsistency federal circuit courts of
appeal exhibit regarding the issue of on-campus versus off-campus speech. In a 2011
case in Pennsylvania, Layshock v. Hermitage School District, a student used an offcampus computer to access a social networking website and create a fake Internet profile
of his high school principal. The school district suspended the student. 230 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the district’s response to the student’s
conduct violated the First Amendment because, among other reasons, there was not an
adequate link between the speech and the school. Administrators’ efforts to shut down
student access to the profile on school computers and the student “buzz” about the profile
resulted in a “rather minimal” disturbance and did not satisfy the Tinker standard. The
court matter-of-factly stated:
We are asked to determine if a school district can punish a student for
expressive conduct that originated outside of the schoolhouse, did not
disturb the school environment and was not related to any school
sponsored event. We hold that, under these circumstances, the First
Amendment prohibits the school from reaching beyond the schoolyard to
impose what might otherwise be appropriate discipline. 231
The school district also claimed that the student’s speech should be treated as “oncampus” speech because it was aimed at the principal, was accessed on campus by the
student, and would probably come to the attention of the school district and the principal.
The district court held that the student’s punishment was not appropriate under Fraser
because “[t]here is no evidence that Justin engaged in any lewd or profane speech while
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in school.” 232 It also held that the student’s punishment was not appropriate under Tinker
because the School District did “not establish … a sufficient [link] between the student’s
speech and a substantial disruption of the school environment.” 233
However, in a concurring opinion, Judge Kent Jordan (joined by Judge Thomas
Vanaskie) argued that Tinker can and should be applied to off-campus speech in certain
circumstances:
We cannot sidestep the central tension between good order and expressive
rights by leaning on property lines. With the tools of modern technology, a
student could, with malice aforethought, engineer egregiously disruptive
events and, if the trouble-maker were savvy enough to tweet the
organizing communications from his or her cellphone while standing one
foot outside school property, the school administrators might succeed in
heading off the actual disruption in the building but would be left
powerless to discipline the student. 234
The same year that the Third Circuit decided Layshock (2011), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was presented with a case that also involved off-campus
speech, but this time, the controversial material was about a student. In Kowalski v.
Berkeley County Schools, a West Virginia student used her home computer to create a
web page that ridiculed a classmate. 235
The webpage contained comments accusing Shay N. of having herpes and
being a “slut,” as well as photographs reinforcing those defamatory
accusations by depicting a sign across her pelvic area, which stated,
“Warning: Enter at your own risk” and labeling her portrait as that of a
“whore.” One student's posting dismissed any concern for Shay N.'s
reaction with a comment that said, “screw her.” This is not the conduct
and speech that our educational system is required to tolerate…. 236
Given the targeted, defamatory nature of Kowalski's speech, aimed at a fellow classmate,
it created “actual or nascent” substantial disorder and disruption in the school, according
to the court. 237 Administrators suspended the student from school for five days and
imposed a 90-day “social suspension” disallowing her from participating in school-
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sponsored extracurricular activities. The student alleged that the administration violated
her First Amendment rights, but the Fourth Circuit disagreed. Because there was a strong
link (often called a “nexus” in legal language) between the student’s speech and the
school’s pedagogical interests, and because the speech was “materially and substantially
disruptive,” it was foreseeable that her conduct would create problems for the school.
Writing for the court, Circuit Judge Paul Niemeyer said school administrators “must be
able to prevent and punish harassment and bullying in order to provide a safe school
environment conducive to learning.” 238
Does Parody Fall Under Fraser?
In the 2011 Pennsylvania case Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals applied Fraser (even though the case did not involve a speech at
a school assembly) to uphold the suspension of student who posted an unflattering parody
of his school principal, James McGonigle, on MySpace.com. Riddled with vulgarities
and spelling and punctuation errors, the parody contained the following information on
the “About Me” section:
HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. it's your oh so wonderful, hairy,
expressionless, sex addict, fagass, put on this world with a small dick
PRINCIPAL[.] I have come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other
principal's [sic] to be just like me. I know, I know, you're all thrilled[.]
Another reason I came to myspace is because—I am keeping an eye on
you students (who[m] I care for so much)[.] For those who want to be my
friend, and aren't in my school[,] I love children, sex (any kind), dogs,
long walks on the beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but not least my
darling wife who looks like a man (who satisfies my needs) 239
The parody did not cause a substantial disruption under Tinker, but was found to fall
under Fraser because it was particularly offensive and vulgar, which violated school
policy. The court wrote:
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J.S.'s speech is not the type of speech that the Tinker Court so vehemently
protected. I agree with the majority that the facts in the record fail to
demonstrate substantial disruption at the School. But the profile's potential
to cause disruption was reasonably foreseeable, and that is sufficient ... .
Two forms of disruption were foreseeable. First, the MySpace page posed
a reasonably foreseeable threat of interference with the educational
environment. If J.S.'s speech went unpunished, it would undermine
McGonigle's authority and disrupt the educational process. Second, J.S.'s
speech posed a reasonably foreseeable threat of disrupting the operations
of the classroom. It was foreseeable that J.S.'s false accusations and
malicious comments would disrupt [McGonigle’s] ability to perform [his]
job. 240
Thus, according to the Third Circuit in this case, schools may infringe on student speech
generated off campus through implementation of existing conduct policies.
Social Commentary Trumps Vulgarity
In 2013, the Third Circuit faced another dispute in Pennsylvania over First
Amendment rights at school. However, because the expression was considered to be
commentary on a social issue rather than mere vulgarity, the students stood a better
chance of winning their case. In B.H. v. Easton Area School District, when two middleschool students purchased bracelets bearing the slogan “I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A
BREAST)” as part of a national breast-cancer-awareness campaign, the school district
banned the bracelets. 241 The students brought suit asking for a preliminary injunction
barring enforcement of the ban, and the district court held that the ban violated the
students’ rights to free speech and issued a preliminary injunction against it. The Third
Circuit affirmed, and—in so doing—fashioned a three-part test for cases in this area of
the law:
(1) plainly lewd speech, which offends for the same reasons obscenity
offends, may be categorically restricted regardless of whether it comments
on political or social issues, (2) speech that does not rise to the level of
plainly lewd but that a reasonable observer could interpret as lewd may be
categorically restricted as long as it cannot plausibly be interpreted as
commenting on political or social issues, and (3) speech that does not rise
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to the level of plainly lewd and that could plausibly be interpreted as
commenting on political or social issues may not be categorically
restricted. Because the bracelets here are not plainly lewd and because
they comment on a social issue, they may not be categorically banned
under Fraser. The School District has also failed to show that the bracelets
threatened to substantially disrupt the school under Tinker. 242
Protection (or Lack Thereof) for University Students
All of the preceding federal cases involved First Amendment disputes at the K-12
level. However, federal courts also regularly address First Amendment disputes at the
postsecondary level. Some courts, to the bewilderment of First Amendment advocates,
apply K-12 precedents to cases at the college and university level. Student media
advocacy organizations such as the Student Press Law Center based in Washington, D.C.,
have become increasingly concerned about the idea of courts treating adult students—
even graduate students—as the legal equivalent of middle school students in cases
involving disputes between students and universities. Federal cases involving First
Amendment protection at the university level will be the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
FEDERAL CASES AT THE UNIVERSITY LEVEL
Although some student press advocates are concerned about recent decisions
curtailing the speech and press rights of college students, First Amendment protections
for postsecondary school students are on much firmer footing than are protections for K12 students.
The 1960 and 1970s: Students and Editorial Control
The birth of college press freedom began even before Tinker, when an Alabama
federal district court in 1967 ruled in favor of a student editor in Dickey v. Alabama State
Board of Education. In Dickey, a disagreement over content in the student newspaper
resulted in student editor Gary Dickey’s suspension from Troy State University. 243
Dickey wrote an editorial commenting on the governor and state legislature’s insistence
that no articles be published that were critical of them. The president of the university,
Dr. Frank Rose, disagreed with this policy, and Dickey wanted to write an article
supporting the president. As the court noted:
It is without controversy in this case that the basis for the denial of
Dickey's right to publish his editorial supporting Dr. Rose was a rule that
had been invoked at Troy State College to the effect that there could be no
editorials written in the school paper which were critical of the Governor
of the State of Alabama or the Alabama Legislature. The rule did not
prohibit editorials or articles of a laudatory nature concerning the
Governor or the Legislature. 244
Dickey was told by his advisor that he could not publish the column. Instead,
Dickey decided to run a blank space in place of the article with the word “censored.” For
this action, Dickey was suspended, and he subsequently took his case to federal court,
claiming a violation of his First Amendment rights. In ordering that Dickey be allowed
to return to the school, the district court judge said:
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State school officials cannot infringe on their students' right of free and
unrestricted expression as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States where the exercise of such right does not materially and
substantially interfere with requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school. 245
For decades after this court decision, university press freedom continued to grow. In fact,
Marc Abrams in the book Law of the Student Press calls the period after Dickey a “30plus year winning streak for America’s college student media when contesting
administrative censorship.” 246
In a continuation of legal protections for university press freedom, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in the 1973 case Bazaar v. Fortune that officials at
the University of Mississippi could not censor publication of “earthy language” in the
school’s literary magazine. Circuit Judge Lewis R. Morgan said:
The University here is clearly an arm of the state and this single fact will
always distinguish it from the purely private publisher as far as censorship
rights are concerned. It seems a well-established rule that once a
University recognizes a student activity which has elements of free
expression, it can act to censor that expression only if it acts consistent
with First Amendment constitutional guarantees. 247
The same year (1973), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard
arguments in Joyner v. Whiting. In this case, the Echo student newspaper at North
Carolina Central University published an editorial urging students to fight efforts to
integrate their historically African-American college. The president tried to withhold
funding from the newspaper, citing “standard journalistic criteria” and a lack of content
showing “the full spectrum of views” on campus. President Whiting wrote the following
letter to student editor Johnnie Edward Joyner:
In my view the September 16 issue of the Campus Echo does not meet
standard journalistic criteria nor does it represent fairly the full spectrum
of views on this campus. Because of this, I am writing to advise that funds
for the publication of additional issues will be withheld until agreement
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can be reached regarding the standards to which further publications will
adhere. If consensus cannot be established then this University will not
sponsor a campus newspaper. That portion of remaining funds collected or
allocated to the Campus Echo budget will accrue to the credit of all
contributing students for this school year. 248
The president's attorneys explained to him that because North Carolina Central
University is a state institution, he could not refuse to financially support the newspaper.
Undeterred, the president halted the paper's financial support and refunded to each
student a share of the activity fee allocated to the Echo. As a result, several issues of the
Echo were published without the university's financial support, but the paper ultimately
could not survive without its subsidy from student fees.
Circuit Judge John D. Butzner rejected the university’s argument:
Fortunately, we travel through well charted waters to determine whether
the permanent denial of financial support to the newspaper because of its
editorial policy abridged the freedom of the press. The First Amendment is
fully applicable to the states … and precedent establishes “that state
colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from [its] sweep.” A
college, acting “as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech
. . . simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be
abhorrent.” … It may well be that a college need not establish a campus
newspaper, or, if a paper has been established, the college may
permanently discontinue publication for reasons wholly unrelated to the
First Amendment. But if a college has a student newspaper, its publication
cannot be suppressed because college officials dislike its editorial
comment.” 249
The 1980s and 1990s: Students and Offensive Material
As with the previous decade, the decade of the 1980s was also a positive time for
press freedom advocates at the university level. In 1983, the case Stanley v. Magrath was
decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The dispute began when the
University of Minnesota’s board of regents were angered over a finals week humor issue
of the student newspaper:
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In June 1979 the “Finals Week” edition or “Humor Issue” of the
Minnesota Daily, styled in the format of sensationalist newspapers,
contained articles, advertisements, and cartoons satirizing Christ, the
Roman Catholic Church, evangelical religion, public figures, numerous
social, political, and ethnic groups, social customs, popular trends, and
liberal ideas. In addressing these subjects, the paper frequently used
scatological language and explicit and implicit references to sexual acts.
There was, for example, a blasphemous “interview” with Jesus on the
Cross that would offend anyone of good taste, whether with or without
religion. No contention is made, however, that the newspaper met the legal
definition of obscenity. 250
In a maneuver reminiscent of the Joyner case from the previous decade, the university
attempted to change the funding for the student newspaper by allowing students to
request a refund of the portion of their student activity fee that went to the paper. Circuit
Judge Richard S. Arnold would not allow the university to take such action:
[The university’s] stated reason was solicitude for students who objected
to buying a newspaper they did not want. Our study of the record,
however, leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that this change
in funding would not have occurred absent the public hue and cry that the
Daily's offensive contents provoked. Reducing the revenues available to
the newspaper is therefore forbidden by the First Amendment, as made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, and the Daily is entitled to an
injunction restoring the former system of funding. 251
The Circuit Court’s decision overturned an earlier ruling by a federal district court, which
illustrates the fact that even federal courts can be uncomfortable with the First
Amendment’s protection of offensive material.
In the 1996 California case Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, a tenured
professor of English brought suit under the First Amendment after he was disciplined for
violating his college’s sexual harassment policy by using profanity and discussing sex,
pornography, obscenity, cannibalism, and other controversial topics in a confrontational,
devil’s advocate style in class. 252 One student believed the sexual comments, some of
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which involved consensual sex with children, “were directed intentionally at her and
other female students in a humiliating and harassing manner.” 253
The school ordered the professor to:
1. Provide a syllabus concerning his teaching style, purpose, content, and
method to his students at the beginning of class and to the department chair by
certain deadlines;
2. Attend a sexual harassment seminar within ninety days;
3. Undergo a formal evaluation procedure in accordance with the collective
bargaining agreement; and
4. Become sensitive to the particular needs and backgrounds of his students, and
to modify his teaching strategy when it becomes apparent that his techniques
create a climate which impedes the students' ability to learn.
Cohen was, additionally, advised that further violation of the Policy would
result in further discipline “up to and including suspension or termination”
and the Board ordered that its decision be placed in Cohen's personnel
file. 254
The Ninth Circuit held that the policy was unconstitutionally vague as applied to
the teacher’s in-class speech, noting that the speech did not fall within the policy’s core
definition of sexual harassment and that the teacher had used this teaching style for years.
2000s: Courts Begin Limiting University Student Speech
In the first decade of the new millennium, a line of cases showed that courts were
tending to rule against students pursuing First Amendment claims against their
universities. But before this development began, university press freedom was
energetically endorsed in a federal case in 2001. In Kincaid v. Gibson, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that administrators at Kentucky State University
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violated students’ rights by refusing to distribute the school yearbook. 255 University
officials objected to the content of the yearbook and the color of its cover, among other
things. However, their main objection was that the yearbook looked amateurish and
would be an embarrassment to the university. The court held that: (1) the yearbook was a
limited public forum for First Amendment purposes; (2) By confiscating all copies of the
yearbook, university officials did not impose reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction upon the speech in the limited public forum; (3) the Hazelwood case did not
apply at the university level; and (4) school officials’ conduct violated the First
Amendment even if yearbook was not considered a public forum. In the ruling, Judge R.
Guy Cole wrote, “There is little if any difference between hiding from public view the
words and pictures students use to portray their college experience, and forcing students
to publish a state-sponsored script. In either case, the government alters student
expression by obliterating it.” 256 Cole’s ruling continued the legacy of the Supreme
Court’s Barnette case, when Justice Robert H. Jackson warned against any attempt by a
state official to “prescribe what shall be orthodox.”
However, student press advocates were disappointed when, in 2002, the Ninth
Circuit—the same court that protected the professor in Cohen—applied the Hazelwood
test to a university dispute in California. Brown v. Li arose because university policy
required a graduate student to submit his thesis to a committee for final approval before
filing the thesis with the university library. 257 In accordance with this policy, the student
submitted his thesis to the committee, which approved the thesis. Graduate thesis papers
often contain an “acknowledgements” section wherein students thank certain people for
their help or moral support. However, the student then inserted a
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“disacknowledgements” section into his thesis—criticizing people for perceived
wrongs—and attempted to file the thesis in the university library. When members of the
committee realized this, they prohibited the student from filing the thesis but still allowed
him to receive his degree. Applying the Hazelwood test, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
committee’s actions, holding that the assignment was part of the student’s curriculum and
the committee’s decision was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical objective:
teaching the student the proper format for a scientific paper. The court said:
The parties have not identified, nor have we found, any Supreme Court
case discussing the appropriate standard for reviewing a university's
regulation of students' curricular speech. It is thus an open question
whether Hazelwood articulates the standard for reviewing a university's
assessment of a student's academic work. We conclude that it does. 258
Because of the explicitly stated requirements for the format of a thesis, the court
concluded that the university committee had every right to order the removal of the
“disacknowledgements” section in accordance with the proper format for academic
papers. However, some student press advocates believe applying the K-12 case
Hazelwood to a university was a serious error, portending a coming era when judges
would apply principles from cases involving middle school and high school students to
the university context. On the other hand, the facts of the case—considering that the
format of a thesis would be seen as within the purview of the university’s authority to
establish curriculum requirements—suggest that the case will have limited precedential
value when it comes to disputes involving more common forms of student expression.
The Hosty Bombshell
In 2005, in Hosty v. Carter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
applied Hazelwood in a case involving a newspaper at a public university in Illinois.
When the Governors State University student newspaper, The Innovator, began printing
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articles that were critical of university employees, the dean told the printer that the
university would not pay for any issues that had not been reviewed and approved in
advance. 259 The students who worked at the newspaper filed suit against the dean
(Patricia Carter), the university, and others for depriving them of First Amendment rights
in violation of a federal law known as “Section 1983” that authorizes a civil suit seeking
damages against public officials.
The narrow (5-4) Hosty decision (which affects states in the Seventh Circuit, with
jurisdiction over Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin) has been the subject of debate and
handwringing by advocates for a free student press. Free-press advocates were
disappointed by the court’s decision that the Hazelwood standard (established by the
Supreme Court in a high school case) can apply in the university setting. Some student
press advocates believe that opening the door to Hazelwood at the college level makes
Hosty a dangerous decision for student press freedom. The court could just as easily have
gone the other way (as the dissenters did, which will be discussed below) in recognizing
the distinction between the appropriate level of control over students who are children
and students who are adults.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether the more
administration-friendly standard in Hazelwood applies equally in the context of public
university education (as opposed to elementary or high school education). In a footnote
to Hazelwood, the Supreme Court said: “[a] number of lower federal courts have
similarly recognized that educators’ decisions with regard to the content of schoolsponsored newspapers, dramatic productions, and other expressive activities are entitled
to substantial deference. We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference
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is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and
university level.” 260
Writing for the majority in Hosty, Judge Easterbrook referred to this footnote:
…Plaintiffs argue, and the district court held, that Hazelwood is
inapplicable to university newspapers and that post-secondary educators
therefore cannot ever insist that student newspapers be submitted for
review and approval. Yet this footnote does not even hint at the possibility
of an on/off switch: high school papers reviewable, college papers not
reviewable. It addresses degrees of deference. Whether some review is
possible depends on the answer to the public-forum question, which does
not (automatically) vary with the speakers’ age. 261
It is odd that the majority of the en banc court (the full court of appeals) agreed
with Easterbrook, considering the back-and-forth nature of his decision (at times leaning
toward the students, but at other times leaning toward the university)—as well as his
inability to settle on the status of the newspaper. Was it a public forum? If so, what
kind? In contrast, the dissenters had a clearer argument, which will be discussed below.
Easterbrook noted that the newspaper in Hosty was subsidized by the university,
and “[f]reedom of speech does not imply that someone else must pay.” 262 He reasoned
that the student newspaper might be a “designated public forum” or “limited-purpose
public forum,” both of which have some censorship protections, requiring the university
to show that the regulation or administrative action is content-neutral; that it serves a
substantial government interest; that there is not a total ban on communication; and that it
is no more restrictive than is necessary to serve the government interest. 263
Easterbrook never took a clear position on what kind of forum existed. Frank
LoMonte of the Student Press Law Center criticized Judge Easterbrook’s failure to
ultimately determine whether the newspaper was a limited public forum. In LoMonte’s
opinion, Easterbrook was too preoccupied with the question of whether school officials
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had immunity from the lawsuit. In an article for The First Amendment Law Review,
LoMonte wrote:
The court embarked on a rambling and not entirely coherent expedition
through forum doctrine, suggesting without firmly concluding that the
Innovator likely would have qualified for heightened First Amendment
status as a designated public forum--a question mooted when the case was
pretermitted on immunity grounds. 264
In the student newspaper context, the forum analysis can be confusing because
many student newspapers are subsidized in some manner by the university with which
they are connected. Such subsidy can take different forms. For example, a university
may provide any combination of funds, physical space, materials, logistical support
services, salaries for faculty advisors, or even course credit or extra credit for journalism
student participation in the newspaper. If there is any form of sponsorship or subsidy by
the university, the student newspaper could be a limited public forum, which can open the
door to disputes about the purposes for which the forum was created and whether the
university has sufficiently justified the restriction on speech.
Hosty’s Numerous Problems
Hosty was an appeal decided solely on the issue of qualified official immunity of
Dean Carter and others—not on the merits of a constitutional challenge. Nevertheless,
that did not stop Judge Frank Easterbrook from discussing several other questions—only
to leave them unresolved. These questions involved (1) the forum status of the
newspaper, (2) the relationship between the forum status and the possible violation of the
students’ First Amendment rights, (3) the relationship (if any) between the forum status
and immunity, and (4) the decision of what to do if the students’ First Amendment rights
were violated—e.g., did university officials infringe “clearly established rights,” thus

93

losing the immunity that is normally granted to public officials in the exercise of their
duties?
The Hosty case is both important and frustrating. Several key issues are left
dangling that could have been resolved with a more comprehensive and thoughtful
opinion. Easterbrook did not explain how the determination of the newspaper’s forum
status relates to whether Dean Carter and other administrators enjoy immunity for their
actions. He concluded that the rights at stake were not clearly established and therefore
immunity is upheld. However, he does not explain whether the forum status of the
newspaper had some impact on whether the First Amendment rights of the students were
sufficiently established for the administrators to know what they were doing was a
violation of those rights. He implied that the newspaper was a limited public forum
because of the subsidies offered by the university, but because he stopped short of
concluding it was such a forum, he did not explain why that distinction matters. If it is a
public forum, the university is limited by the First Amendment from interfering with the
content or operation of the newspaper. But since the case is based on immunity and
Section 1983 liability, the question of forum status is not given proper attention.
Hosty and Qualified Immunity
The immunity question posed to the court in Hosty was whether the constitutional
rights of the student editors were so clearly established that Dean Carter should have
known she was violating them when taking the action she did. The protection offered by
qualified immunity has been developed in case law over a period of many years to
prevent administrative officials from constantly facing lawsuits over their decisions. It is
a difficult standard to meet, and thus many lawsuits brought against public officials are
unsuccessful.
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The court concluded that because of the lack of precedent in this area, Carter did
not knowingly violate clearly established rights. Easterbrook wrote: “One might well say
as a ‘broad general proposition’ something like ‘public officials may not censor speech in
a designated public forum,’ but whether Dean Carter was bound to know that the
Innovator operated in such a forum is a different question altogether.” 265 The Hosty
majority used the district court’s decision as a way to narrow the question presented in
such a way to find in favor of the public official:
The district court held that any reasonable college administrator should
have known that (a) the approach of Hazelwood does not apply to
colleges; and (b) only speech that is part of the curriculum is subject to
supervision. We have held that neither of these propositions is correct—
that Hazelwood’s framework is generally applicable and depends in large
measure on the operation of public-forum analysis rather than the
distinction between curricular and extra-curricular activities.
But even if student newspapers at high schools and colleges
operate under different constitutional frameworks, as both the district
judge and our panel thought, it greatly overstates the certainty of the law
to say that any reasonable college administrator had to know that rule.
… 266
The majority also justified narrowing its decision by citing the arguments of the parties:
For reasons that should by now be evident, the implementation of
Hazelwood means that both legal and factual uncertainties dog the
litigation—and it is the function of qualified immunity to ensure that such
uncertainties are resolved by prospective relief rather than by financial
exactions from public employees. 267
Hosty and Prior Review
Judge Terence T. Evans, writing for the four dissenters, said: “Prior to
Hazelwood, courts were consistently clear that university administrators could not require
prior review of student media or otherwise censor student newspapers.” 268 Evans also
said:
The Innovator, as opposed to writing merely about football games,
actually chose to publish hard-hitting stories. And these articles were
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critical of the school administration. In response, rather than applauding
the young journalists, the University decided to prohibit publication unless
a school official reviewed the paper's content before it was printed. Few
restrictions on speech seem to run more afoul of basic First Amendment
values. First, prior restraints are particularly noxious under the
Constitution. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96
S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976) (“prior restraints on speech and
publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on
First Amendment rights”); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713, 51 S.Ct.
625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931) (“it has been generally, if not universally,
considered that it is the chief purpose of the [First Amendment's free
press] guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication”). Second,
and even more fundamental, as Justice Frankfurter stated (albeit in
somewhat dated language) in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665,
673–74, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525 (1944), “one of the prerogatives of
American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures.”
College students—voting-age citizens and potential future leaders—
should feel free to question, challenge, and criticize government action.
Nevertheless, as a result of today's holding, Dean Carter could have
censored the Innovator by merely establishing “legitimate pedagogical
reasons.” This court now gives the green light to school administrators to
restrict student speech in a manner inconsistent with the First
Amendment. 269
The decision in Hosty was simply to recognize that because Hazelwood applies at
the university level, the existing law was not clear enough to strip the university
administrator of immunity. This leaves somewhat unsettled the extent to which student
journalists can seek First Amendment protection when university administrations
exercise prior review over student newspapers in Indiana, Wisconsin, and Illinois.
Despite Hosty, Protections Still Exist
It is important to remember that the Hosty decision did not overrule the
precedents that protect student First Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit’s decision
in Hosty cannot supplant or supersede the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. For
example, in a 2000 concurring opinion, Justice David Souter recognized that the Supreme
Court’s “university cases have dealt with restrictions imposed from outside the academy
on individual teachers’ speech or associations,” whereas “cases dealing with the right of
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teaching institutions to limit expressive freedom of students have been confined to high
schools, whose students and their schools’ relation to them are different and at least
arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college education” (emphasis
added). 270
At the time of Hosty, only one of the U.S. Appeal Circuits held that the
Hazelwood analysis cannot be applied in a university context. In a footnote in Student
Government Association v. Board of Trustees, the First Circuit incorrectly suggested in
1989 that the Supreme Court in Hazelwood had actually decided the issue. 271 Other
circuits had either adopted the Hazelwood analysis in the university setting or had applied
it in a modified form. 272 Yet, while Hazelwood somewhat altered the context (whether at
the university or high school level), Hazelwood probably did not change the results of the
substantive law when it comes to a university-level publication or other expressive
activity.
In Ward v. Polite¸ a 2012 decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, the court expressly held that Hazelwood applies in the university setting. 273
Ward involved the dismissal of a student from Eastern Michigan University’s graduate
counseling program. The student in a practicum course requested to refer, rather than
directly counsel, a homosexual client, because the student believed the counseling would
conflict with the student’s personal religious beliefs. Ultimately, the court reversed the
summary judgment that had been entered in the university’s favor and permitted the
student’s First Amendment claim to proceed to trial. 274 In dicta concerning student
newspapers, the Ward court made clear that the context of the Hazelwood analysis could
vary greatly between the university and high school settings:
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Nothing in Hazelwood suggests a stop-go distinction between student
speech at the high school and university levels, and we decline to create
one. … By requiring restrictions on student speech to be reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns, Hazelwood allows teachers
and administrators to account for the “level of maturity” of the student.
Although it may be reasonable for a principal to delete a story about
teenage pregnancy from a high school newspaper, the same could not
(likely) be said about a college newspaper. To the extent that the
justification for editorial control depends on the audience’s maturity, the
difference between high school and university students makes all the
difference. 275
The Ward court also suggested that it is the public forum analysis that may
typically be unfriendly to students’ freedom of expression:
Hazelwood also features a question crucial to the resolution of all schoolspeech cases, whether at the high school or university level: Whose speech
is it? The closer expression comes to school-sponsored speech, the less
likely the First Amendment protects it. And the less the speech has to do
with the curriculum and school-sponsored activities, the less likely any
suppression will further a legitimate pedagogical concern, which is why
the First Amendment permits suppression under those circumstances only
if the speech causes substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities. 276
It is interesting to contemplate the relationship between a school-sponsored
publication (such as a university alumni magazine) and the subsidizing of a school
newspaper. The Ward court suggests that if it is school-sponsored speech, less First
Amendment protection is available to student journalists. Hosty and other cases suggest
that if the paper is subsidized with university money, it is more likely to be a limited
public forum and thus students will get greater First Amendment protection. At what
point does subsidy (thus enhanced First Amendment rights for students) become schoolsponsored (limited First Amendment rights for students)?
This quandary suggests that public forum status may be the wrong standard to use
in student First Amendment cases, and a review of legal articles echoes the confusion
surrounding public forum analysis. In a 2009 issue of Nova Law Review, Marc Rohr
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explored “the ongoing mystery of the limited public forum,” concluding with a simple
plea: “Above all, give us clarity, please.” 277 If legal scholars and judges cannot agree on
what a public forum is, perhaps it is the wrong principle to use in deciding First
Amendment cases.
Both the Hosty and Ward decisions suggest that the applicability of Hazelwood in
the university setting will not alter the conclusion that traditional university student
newspapers (i.e., newspapers produced and managed by students and that are
extracurricular activities) are beyond the editorial control or censorship of university
faculty and administrators. Instead, the various distinctions between the university
setting and the high school or elementary school settings are borne out in the application
of the Hazelwood analysis; i.e., university student newspapers are typically public forums
while high school student newspapers are not typically public forums. Subsequent
decisions in the Seventh Circuit applying Hosty confirm this assertion. 278
Likewise, other circuits that have applied Hazelwood in the university setting
have maintained the same pre-existing robust First Amendment protection for traditional
student newspapers. In Husain v. Springer 279, the Second Circuit held:
The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, therefore, have adopted the
position that the establishment of a student media outlet, in essence,
necessarily involves the creation of a limited public forum where the only
restraint is on the speakers who can participate (i.e., students) and where
there can be no restrictions on the content of the outlet except with respect
to content that threatens the maintenance of order at the university. Two
other circuits, while also recognizing that student media outlets often
enjoy First Amendment protection from interference by school
administrators, have taken a less expansive view. The Sixth and Seventh
Circuits agree that the establishment of a student media outlet can create a
limited public forum but have concluded that the scope of that forum can
be restricted by the school. In other words, these courts do not consider the
creation of a student media outlet as categorically involving the creation of
a limited public forum within which students may speak on essentially any
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subject without fear of reprisal, but rather look to the context of the public
university’s treatment of a student media outlet, including its intent in
creating the outlet and practices with respect to the outlet, in order to
determine what First Amendment protection the outlet, and those that
participate in it, receive.
Nevertheless, although the treatment of forum analysis with
respect to student media outlets at public universities has differed in some
respects in the various circuits, all the circuits that have considered the
issue have determined that, at the very least, when a public university
creates or subsidizes a student newspaper and imposes no ex ante
restrictions on the content that the newspaper may contain, neither the
school nor its officials may interfere with the viewpoints expressed in the
publication without running afoul of the First Amendment.
We agree that, at a minimum, when a public university establishes
a student media outlet and requires no initial restrictions on content, it may
not censor, retaliate, or otherwise chill that outlet’s speech, or the speech
of the student journalists who produce it, on the basis of content or
viewpoints expressed through that outlet. This holding is fully consistent
with and, indeed, substantially follows from, our decisions, and those of
the Supreme Court, in other cases addressing limited public fora. 280
Hosty’s Silver Lining
A silver lining from Hosty is that it ultimately inspired a greater level of
protection for student newspapers at public universities in Illinois. Shortly after the
Hosty decision, the Illinois legislature reacted to the case by enacting the Illinois College
Campus Press Act, which explicitly declared all student-run newspapers at Illinois public
universities to be public forums in which university administrators could have no
editorial control or ability to censor content. 281 The federal courts in Illinois have
expressly held that the Act supersedes the holding in Hosty to the extent of any
conflict. 282
This is an interesting issue when it comes to the power of courts. It is an
important feature of our democratic system that judicial rulings are subject to
modification by legislative bodies (federal judges are not accountable to the people —
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legislators are). However, if federal courts base the ruling on a constitutional provision,
legislation cannot modify the ruling.
It could be argued that, at least in the state of Illinois, the Hosty decision has no
lasting practical effect. If anything, the Hosty decision ultimately generated more
vigorous protections for student journalists by encouraging the Illinois legislature to pass
the Illinois College Campus Press Act. Furthermore, the ruling focused the attention of
the student press community about the extent to which student journalists should be free
to choose the content of their publications. This act, as well as other state legislatures’
attempts to protect student-produced media, will be the focus of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
STATE LEGISLATION AND STATE COURT CASES
The extent to which students are protected by the First Amendment when they
publish a school newspaper or disseminate information in some other form has long been
the subject of dispute and, as earlier chapters have demonstrated, has been mostly
undefined by the courts. In recent years, various state legislatures have passed laws
granting more extensive and explicit protection to student journalists by limiting the
authority of school administrators to restrain publication in advance or otherwise censor
the students’ work. Some of those laws also provide immunity from liability for school
districts that are prevented from interfering with student press freedom. Although the
laws vary in how they provide greater First Amendment protection, they seem to suggest
a growing recognition by some state legislators that student publications are important,
both to readers, who become better informed about school activities and issues, and for
students, who use the publication as a laboratory to develop their skills. Interest in
passing legislation may have been inspired by several court decisions, including the U.S.
Supreme Court’s ruling in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hosty v. Carter, discussed earlier in this dissertation.
Eight states (Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Massachusetts, and Oregon) have passed laws strengthening protection for student
expression, particularly with regard to school-sponsored publications. Some statutes
protect secondary school students, some protect university students, while others protect
both. This chapter will discuss the statutes and examine the impact of these laws,
especially as they have been interpreted by state courts.
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Overview of State Statutes Protecting Student Expression
Before analyzing any of these statutes, it is appropriate to provide a general
overview of the kinds of protections that have been enacted by these state legislatures,
and whom these statutes are supposed to protect. For example, the laws in Oregon
(passed in 2007) and Massachusetts (1988) protect students only in public high
schools. 283 The Illinois statute (2007) protects only students at public colleges. 284
Illinois’s statute may suggest a recognition on the part of legislators that younger
students, whose journalism skills have yet to be developed, should be more closely
supervised and their work subjected to closer supervision by school officials before
publication. Importantly, most of the statutes, while providing protection for student
media and expression, recognize exceptions for reasons such as campus disturbance, rulebreaking, and illegal activity.
California Includes Private Schools
California’s statute—by far the most comprehensive—dates back to 1977 and has
been expanded since then. 285 Known as the “Leonard Law,” the California statute
provides protections for free expression to students in all public schools, including
colleges and universities, all charter schools, as well as providing some protection for
students in private high schools. 286 California’s law states, in part:
Pupils of the public schools, including charter schools, shall have the right
to exercise freedom of speech and of the press including, but not limited
to, the use of bulletin boards, the distribution of printed materials or
petitions, the wearing of buttons, badges, and other insignia, and the right
of expression in official publications, whether or not the publications or
other means of expression are supported financially by the school or by
use of school facilities, except that expression shall be prohibited which is
obscene, libelous, or slanderous. Also prohibited shall be material that so
incites pupils as to create a clear and present danger of the commission of
unlawful acts on school premises or the violation of lawful school
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regulations, or the substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the
school. 287
It is worth noting that the First Amendment, and almost the entire Constitution,
applies only to government entities, and public schools are units of local or state
government. (The Thirteenth Amendment, outlawing slavery, could be interpreted as a
section of the Constitution that directly applies to private individuals. But there is a
difference between not requiring a private individual or entity to do something as
opposed to telling a private individual or entity that it cannot do something.) Private
institutions are not obligated to extend First Amendment rights to their employees or
students. Nevertheless, California has tried to extend greater speech and expression
rights to students who attend private schools.
California courts have so far upheld the statute as it applies to private schools. In
1994, the Santa Clara County Superior Court heard Robert J. Corry v. Leland Stanford
Junior University, in which Stanford contested the constitutionality of California’s
educational statute 94367 (the “Leonard Law”) guaranteeing private university students
the same free speech rights on campus as they would have off campus. The trial court
ruled against Stanford, and there was no appeal. 288 Two other cases, Antebi v. Occidental
College 289 and Yu v. University of La Verne 290, have involved the application of the
statute but not the constitutionality of the statute. These cases seem to suggest that the
law is enforceable; the only questions involve its specific application.
Some statutes also limit the scope of protection, covering only those publications
created under the guidance of a staff advisor or teacher. 291 For example, Subheading C
of California’s statute states:
…it shall be the responsibility of a journalism adviser or advisers of pupil
publications within each school to supervise the production of the pupil
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staff, to maintain professional standards of English and journalism, and to
maintain the provisions of this section. 292
For all the strength of California’s statute, it also demonstrates the difficulty of
laws keeping up with technology. For example, California’s statute contains more than
400 words, and was amended in 2008, but says nothing about social media. 293
Students Decide Content
One of the most important elements of several of the laws is a recognition that
students—and not teachers or administrators—should determine the content of their
publications. In California, Iowa, and Oregon, student expressive freedom statutes grant
student journalists the right to freely assign, write, and edit the content (news, opinion,
and features sections) of their journalism publications. 294 For example, Iowa’s statute,
“Student Exercise of Free Expression,” passed in 1989, states, “Student editors of official
school publications shall assign and edit the news, editorial, and feature content of their
publications subject to the limitations of this section.” 295
Ban on Prior Restraint
Another key area of protection for the student press is the ban on prior restraint by
school administrators. Several state student press statutes, including those in California,
Colorado, Illinois, and Iowa, explicitly prohibit the exercise of prior restraint by school
administrators. 296 Thus, Colorado’s statute, “Rights of Free Expression for Public School
Students,” states:
(1) The general assembly declares that students of the public schools shall
have the right to exercise freedom of speech and of the press, and no
expression contained in a student publication, whether or not such
publication is school-sponsored, shall be subject to prior restraint except
for the types of expression described in subsection (3) of this section. This
section shall not prevent the advisor from encouraging expression which is
consistent with high standards of English and journalism. (2) If a
publication written substantially by students is made generally available
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throughout a public school, it shall be a public forum for students of such
school. (3) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to authorize the
publication or distribution in any media by students of the following:
(a) Expression that is obscene;
(b) Expression that is libelous, slanderous, or defamatory under state law;
(c) Expression that is false as to any person who is not a public figure or
involved in a matter of public concern; or
(d) Expression that creates a clear and present danger of the commission
of unlawful acts, the violation of lawful school regulations, or the
material and substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the
school or that violates the rights of others to privacy or that threatens
violence to property or persons. 297
This provision in Illinois state law, which was upheld and reinforced by a federal
court, 298 says the following:
All campus media produced primarily by students at a State-sponsored
institution of higher learning is a public forum for expression by the
student journalists and editors at the particular institution. Campus media,
whether campus-sponsored or noncampus-sponsored, is not subject to
prior review by public officials of a State-sponsored institution of higher
learning. 299
Expression Beyond Student Media
Statutes in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Oregon, and Massachusetts provide
that students’ freedom of expression extends to school-sponsored speech, with certain
limitations (such as time, place, and manner restrictions) that will be discussed below. 300
California, Iowa, and Massachusetts grant students freedom of expression in all forms,
also with certain limitations. 301 And the Massachusetts student press freedom statute
additionally provides for freedom of assembly:
The right of students to freedom of expression in the public schools of the
commonwealth shall not be abridged, provided that such right shall not
cause any disruption or disorder within the school. Freedom of expression
shall include without limitation, the rights and responsibilities of students,
collectively and individually, (a) to express their views through speech
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and symbols, (b) to write, publish and disseminate their views, (c) to
assemble peaceably on school property for the purpose of expressing their
opinions. Any assembly planned by students during regularly scheduled
school hours shall be held only at a time and place approved in advance by
the school principal or his designee.
No expression made by students in the exercise of such rights shall
be deemed to be an expression of school policy and no school officials
shall be held responsible in any civil or criminal action for any expression
made or published by the students. 302
Immunity for School Officials
As the Massachusetts statute (above) demonstrates, legislators seemed to
recognize that by limiting the discretion of school officials to regulate the content of
student publications, teachers and principals may be vulnerable to lawsuits by those
harmed by such publications. That is why several of the statutes, in addition to
Massachusetts’s, grant immunity to school officials from such lawsuits. In Colorado,
Iowa, and Kansas, student press statutes protect schools, school districts, and school
officials from liability for the content of student journalism publications. 303
Statutes in Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, and Massachusetts state that the content of
student publications cannot be assumed to represent the policies of the sponsoring or host
school or district. 304 In Kansas, the student press freedom statute shifts liability for
student publications from the district to the student when the students involved are
adults. 305 Kansas’s statute, in its entirety, says the following:
(a) The liberty of the press in student publications shall be protected.
School employees may regulate the number, length, frequency,
distribution and format of student publications. Material shall not be
suppressed solely because it involves political or controversial subject
matter.
(b) Review of material prepared for student publications and
encouragement of the expression of such material in a manner that is
consistent with high standards of English and journalism shall not be
deemed to be or construed as a restraint on publication of the material or
an abridgment of the right to freedom of expression in student
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publications.
(c) Publication or other expression that is libelous, slanderous or obscene
or matter that commands, requests, induces, encourages, commends or
promotes conduct that is defined by law as a crime or conduct that
constitutes a ground or grounds for the suspension or expulsion of students
as enumerated in K.S.A. 72-8901, and amendments thereto, or which
creates a material or substantial disruption of the normal school activity is
not protected by this act.
(d) Subject to the limitations imposed by this section, student editors of
student publications are responsible for determining the news, opinion,
and advertising content of such publications. Student publication advisers
and other certified employees who supervise or direct the preparation of
material for expression in student publications are responsible for teaching
and encouraging free and responsible expression of material and high
standards of English and journalism. No such adviser or employee shall be
terminated from employment, transferred, or relieved of duties imposed
under this subsection for refusal to abridge or infringe upon the right to
freedom of expression conferred by this act.
(e) No publication or other expression of matter by students in the exercise
of rights under this act shall be deemed to be an expression of school
district policy. No school district, member of the board of education or
employee thereof, shall be held responsible in any civil or criminal action
for any publication or other expression of matter by students in the
exercise of rights under this act. Student editors and other students of a
school district, if such student editors and other students have attained the
age of majority, shall be held liable in any civil or criminal action for
matter expressed in student publications to the extent of any such student
editor's or other student's responsibility for and involvement in the
preparation and publication of such matter. 306
Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
The rights students enjoy under state statutes are not limitless. Most states
exclude from protection some speech, such as threats of violence, speech that incites
disturbance, and libel. The Arkansas Student Publications Act also forbids publications
that constitute an “unwarranted invasion of privacy, as defined by state law.” 307 While
these limitations are necessary, they also leave a large gray area for censorship-prone
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school officials. The level of speech protection afforded to students is an uncertain
question that state courts have grappled with since the first statutes were passed.
School administrators in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Oregon,
and Massachusetts are authorized to implement reasonable restrictions on the time, place,
and manner of student expression. 308 Further, schools in most of these states (often
through the journalism advisor) may censor articles or other speech deemed possibly
obscene 309 or libelous, 310 or that meet a number of listed exceptions to the freedom of
expression, including materials which could incite “material and substantial disruption”
on campus, 311 violence, 312 gang activity, 313 law-breaking, 314 or rule breaking. 315
Statutes differ in the amount of expressive freedom explicitly granted to students.
A Colorado statute providing freedom of expression in schools was found by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals to be limited to written materials. 316 Statutes in Arkansas,
Colorado, and Oregon exclude any content that would constitute an invasion of
privacy. 317 What is missing from those laws (except for those pointing to other specific
statutes) is an explicit definition of privacy that would alert those who prepare student
publications that they are encroaching on privacy rights.
Because most students on K-12 campuses are minors, their rights to privacy are
greater than those afforded to adults. Thus, school administrators in these states retain
significant control over some types of content. Some statutes also allow for exceptions to
press freedom for materials deemed harassment, threats, or intimidation. 318 For example,
Illinois’s College Campus Press Act contains the following amendment: “Nothing in this
Act prohibits the imposition of discipline for harassment, threats, or intimidation, unless
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constitutionally protected, or for speech that is not constitutionally protected, including
obscenity or incitement.” 319
There are also some differences in the roles and amount of protection afforded to
advisors. California and Iowa require that the advisors “supervise” and “maintain
professional standards” in addition to enforcing the limits of student expression (such as
preventing content which could incite violence or rule breaking). 320 Advisers in
Colorado, Kansas, and Oregon have lesser authority and are authorized only to
“encourage” or “teach” professional standards, proper English, and other aspects of these
statutes. 321 In California, Iowa, and Kansas, school journalism advisors are also
protected from retaliation by the school administration over objections to the content of
the student press. 322 In other words, a principal cannot fire a journalism advisor because
the principal dislikes an article in the student newspaper.
Additionally, many state legislatures include provisions that protect the
administration of the school from liability for student publications, in order to abolish one
of the justifications for regulation of student speech stated by the Hazelwood court. 323
(Justice White expressed concern in Hazelwood that the views of an individual speaker
could be “erroneously attributed to the school.” 324) Thus, Colorado law states:
No expression made by students in the exercise of freedom of speech or
freedom of the press shall be deemed to be an expression of school policy,
and no school district or employee, or parent, or legal guardian, or official
of such school district shall be held liable in any civil or criminal action
for any expression made or published by students. 325
Providing such immunity is necessary; after all, it would be unfair to tell school
officials, on the one hand, that they cannot censor student publications except for the few
reasons outlined in the statute, but on the other hand, expose them to potential liability.
Legislators likely believed this immunity would encourage school principals and other
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officials to permit controversial or objectionable content to be disseminated when they
otherwise would prevent such publication.
Some state statutes also affirmatively provide for the right to sue when a school
district violates a student’s freedom of expression. For example, California law states that
“a student enrolled in an institution … may commence a civil action to obtain appropriate
injunctive and declaratory relief as determined by the court.” 326 Because school officials
have been held liable for violating First Amendment rights of students in cases involving
the creation of parody websites that do not use school facilities, this is a potentially strong
incentive for school officials to allow publication of material they would have censored
in the past.
How These Laws Reflect Legislators’ Views
Most state legislatures have not enacted statutes protecting student speech.
Reasons for not passing statutes protecting student speech may include the following
reasons.
•

It is simply not a priority. Because legislators have so many other issues to
deal with, they don’t consider this problem to be urgent.

•

There is no organized group supporting First Amendment rights for students
the way lobbyists promote special interests.

•

Legislators fear that robust protection for student speech would embolden
students to be disrespectful or disruptive, with no consequences.

In states that have passed such legislation, these statutes could be said to reflect
legislators’ recognition of student newspapers as an important element in campus life.
These statutes could also suggest legislators’ recognition that freedom of expression is
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essential if students are to understand the important lessons of civics and journalism that
participation in student press can teach. Whatever the case, these laws generally aim to
strike a balance between the school’s need to ensure appropriate student conduct during
school hours and the need for student journalists to exercise the freedom of the press to
its greatest extent. This balance is reflected in the protections these statues provide both
to student journalists and to the schools.
By barring administrators from exercising prior restraint against content presumed
to fall under one of the exceptions, legislators are allowing students who write and
publish during their school careers to develop skills they will use during their journalism
careers. By giving students autonomy to decide what goes in their publications,
legislators are also allowing students to make mistakes that would be more serious if
printed in a professional publication.
As some of the statutes recognize, it is important that school officials retain some
authority to prevent the publication of material they consider to be poor journalism.
After all, many students have underdeveloped research, interviewing, and writing skills,
and teachers or others who supervise newspapers must be able to prevent the publication
of articles that fail to adhere to minimum standards of journalism. Unfortunately, there is
always the possibility that school administrators may claim that they are restraining a
publication because it is shoddy journalism, when the real reason is that the content is
potentially embarrassing to the school.
Federal Versus State Courts
As discussed earlier, in states that passed statutes protecting student expression
rights after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hazelwood, the federal courts have often
recognized that the state statutes extend First Amendment rights to students beyond what
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courts say the U.S. Constitution requires. But what about state courts? There are
significant differences between state and federal courts, due partly to the method of
selection and caseloads of their judges. Federal court judges are appointed by the
president of the United States and serve life terms. 327 State court judges are selected by a
variety of means including appointment by state or local political leaders or direct
election by local voters and their terms vary from one state to the next. 328 As a result,
state court judges may be more susceptible to political bias or currying favor with voters.
Because of their broader jurisdiction, state courts also hear far more cases in a given year
than federal courts. 329 Thus, outcomes in state courts may differ from those in federal
courts hearing the same kinds of cases.
Reliance on State Statutes
In free-speech cases, state courts usually have interpreted student rights based on
the language of the statute (if they have one) and supported the position that these statutes
expand, rather than limit, students’ rights to free speech. Iowa’s legislature, for example,
has provided substantial protections to student journalists. Iowa Code Section 280.22,
adopted in 1989, after the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision, says the following:
1. Except as limited by this section, students of the public schools have the right
to exercise freedom of speech, including the right of expression in official
school publications.
2. Students shall not express, publish, or distribute any of the following:
a. Materials which are obscene.
b. Materials which are libelous or slanderous under chapter 659.
c. Materials which encourage students to do any of the following:
(1) Commit unlawful acts.
(2) Violate lawful school regulations.
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(3) Cause the material and substantial disruption of the orderly
operation of the school.
3. There shall be no prior restraint of material prepared for official school
publications except when the material violates this section.
4. Each board of directors of a public school shall adopt rules in the form of a
written publications code, which shall include reasonable provisions for the
time, place, and manner of conducting such activities within its jurisdiction.
The board shall make the code available to the students and their parents.
5. Student editors of official school publications shall assign and edit the news,
editorial, and feature content of their publications subject to the limitations of
this section. Journalism advisers of students producing official school
publications shall supervise the production of the student staff, to maintain
professional standards of English and journalism, and to comply with this
section.
6. Any expression made by students in the exercise of free speech, including
student expression in official school publications, shall not be deemed to be an
expression of school policy, and the public school district and school
employees or officials shall not be liable in any civil or criminal action for any
student expression made or published by students, unless the school
employees or officials have interfered with or altered the content of the
student speech or expression, and then only to the extent of the interference or
alteration of the speech or expression.
7. “Official school publications” means material produced by students in the
journalism, newspaper, yearbook, or writing classes and distributed to the
student body either free or for a fee.
8. This section does not prohibit a board of directors of a public school from
adopting otherwise valid rules relating to oral communications by students
upon the premises of each school. 330
While applauded by student press freedom advocates, the above statute is
imperfect. For example, it does not cover privacy, suggesting that lawmakers often do
not think about public disclosure of private information or false light when writing laws
concerning student press rights. In addition, it prohibits obscene publications, but
someone can publish something sexually graphic and controversial without meeting the
Miller standards for obscenity. Under Miller, to be considered obscene, the material must
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be “…works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 331 A student newspaper, of course,
can show revealing and disturbing material without being sexually stimulating.
Lange v. Diercks: Protecting the Teacher
To date, Iowa’s state courts have addressed student free speech rights under
Section 280.22 in only one case: Lange v. Diercks in 2011. The following quote is from
the appellate court, which reversed the trial court decision in favor of the school district.
In Lange, Appeals Court Judge Mary E. Tabor wrote:
More than two decades ago, the United States Supreme Court decided that
school administrators did not violate the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over student newspapers as long as their limits on
expression were reasonably related to educational concerns. … A handful
of states, including Iowa, responded to Hazelwood by enacting statutes
more protective of student journalists' free speech rights. This appeal
marks our first opportunity to interpret Iowa's Student Free Expression
Law, Iowa Code section 280.22 (2009). 332
The case began when a journalism teacher was punished by the principal for
allowing students to publish “inappropriate articles” (the administration’s description) in
two different issues of the Waukon High School student newspaper. 333 In a memorandum
supporting their motion for summary judgment, principal Dan Diercks and the Allamakee
Community School District stated that they considered the following content of the 2008
April Fools’ edition to be “of concern”:
•

Changing the title of the paper from Tribe–Une to Bribe–Une;

•

Referring to “Keysux Senior High School” in the masthead (a derogatory
twist of the name of their cross-county rival's mascot Kee Hawks 334

•

Designating the edition as “Issue 66 Volume 6 66 Sixth Avenue N.W.”;
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•

Articles headlined “Tierney to the Rescue”; “Sophomores Not Allowed to
Grand March”; “Cheerleaders on ‘Roids' “; “New Jim Floor Settles”; and
“Cell Phones Allowed”;

•

An article headlined “Meth Lab Found in Biology Lab, Matt Breitbach Faces
Criminal Charges” with an accompanying photo of biology teacher Breitbach;

•

Photographs of a student wearing a headband; a student wearing a hooded
sweatshirt and displaying “gang signs”; a student with a dead cat; and a
student football player; and

•

Quotes from one student who said he would “like to go to a Chippendale's
tryout” after graduation; one student who said she wanted to be “an allAmerican gangster, dog” after graduation; and one student who said he
“totally, like, want[s] to be a super model for Victoria's Secret!” 335

Lange, the teacher, argued that the April Fools’ edition was clearly satire, with
every page of the April 2, 2008, publication containing the following disclaimer: “This
issue is a parody created in celebration of April Fools' Day. It contains no factual
information.” Nevertheless, the following fall, on August 28, 2008, Diercks sent a formal
reprimand to Lange, saying that “numerous inappropriate text, comments, and articles
were created, edited, and printed” in the April Fools’ edition of the student newspaper.
The reprimand also said a “multitude of people from within our school district and a
neighboring school district of Eastern Allamakee were offended by this edition. [The]
administration and the school board felt that the issue was inappropriate and done with
poor judgment, casting a dark shadow on our school district.” 336 The reprimand, in the
form of the letter, was the total punishment.
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The district’s dissatisfaction with Lange’s handling of the newspaper continued
the following fall. Diercks and the District again expressed concern with materials in the
September 30, 2009, edition. In their memorandum supporting their motion for summary
judgment, they stated that they “considered ... the following content of the September 30,
2009 edition ... to be of concern”:
•

An article about smoking and tobacco use headlined “Students Chew, Use
Tobacco” and an accompanying picture of a baby smoking a cigarette;

•

An article headlined “Fashion Guidelines Shift the Focus”;

•

A photograph of a student wearing clothing prohibited by the dress code; and

•

A quote from a student that if he could be “any famous person,” he would
choose to be “Jay Z because he is a gangster.”

On October 1, 2009, Diercks wrote a second formal reprimand to Lange. This
reprimand stated that “[n]umerous inappropriate and questionable text, comments,
pictures, and articles were created, edited, and printed in [the September 30, 2009]
edition.” The letter said staff and community members within the school district were
offended by this edition, and that the administration felt that the issue “undermined our
school district's goals.” The administration also said Lange would be suspended for two
days without pay, but later retracted that part of the letter, substituting it with a new
reprimand. The new reprimand added a complaint about the September 30, 2009, edition;
namely, that it “contain[ed] one article that tacitly encouraged the use of tobacco products
by students within the school setting.” This complaint arose because of a decades-old
photo (origin unknown) of a baby smoking a cigarette). The new reprimand also said that
“[e]ncouraging a violation of law (the use of tobacco products on school premises) is an
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exception to Iowa law that grants broad liberties to student journalists.” The letter went
on to say that “this issue caused anger and embarrassment to students, parents and others,
and the necessity of dealing with complaints [generated by the publication of September
30, 2009,] caused a significant and material disruption to the operation of the school
district.” Importantly, the letter incorporated language from section 280.22(2), noting
that encouragement of illegal activity is unprotected speech for student journalists. 337
These facts show that the statute protects a significant amount of speech. The principal
had to find that the article encouraged a violation of law and school rules—smoking by
underage students—in order to justify the reprimand.
On January 22, 2010, Lange filed a petition for declaratory judgment against
Diercks and the district, asking the court to conclude the publications did not violate
section 280.22 and to order the district to remove the reprimands from his personnel file
and permanently expunge them. In October 2010 both sides moved for summary
judgment. On January 13, 2011, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
district and Diercks. Lange appealed, asking the Iowa Court of Appeals to reverse the
grant of summary judgment in favor of Diercks and the District and to remand to the trial
court his motion for summary judgment. The Iowa Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
journalism teacher:
Because school administrators cannot point to any specific content in the
publications that encouraged students to engage in activities barred by the
statute, we reverse the grant of summary judgment for the district and
principal. We direct the district court to enter summary judgment for the
teacher. Under any definition of the term “encourage,” the content at issue
did not fit within the narrow categories of expression prohibited by section
280.22(2). We further conclude supplemental relief is appropriate;
removing the reprimands from the teacher's personnel file is necessary to
protect students' free speech as contemplated by section 280.22. 338
The court also said:
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As an initial matter, we believe that the district court mistakenly assumed
that our legislature intended to codify Hazelwood. In 1989, the Iowa
General Assembly enacted section 280.22 in reaction to the Supreme
Court's decision one year earlier in Hazelwood. We are persuaded it did so
for the purpose of giving students more robust free-expression rights than
those articulated by the Supreme Court. Commentators uniformly agree
that section 280.22 prohibits school officials from exercising prior
restraint of student publications to the extent allowed under Hazelwood. 339
The school district did not appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court. Importantly, no
Iowa court has cited or referenced Lange v. Diercks since it was decided in 2011,
suggesting that this anti-Hazelwood statute, enacted by the Iowa legislature to protect
student free expression, is effective in deterring schools from infringing on student
expression rights.
The absence of post-Lange decisions by an Iowa court suggests that the statute
discourages school officials from interfering with the content of student publications.
Nevertheless, there may be instances in which school officials exercised censorial power
in violation of the statute that were not tested in court either because the journalism
teacher did not want to anger superiors by bringing a lawsuit or because the teacher did
not have access to legal representation to bring such a suit.
Smith v. Novato: “The Risk Must Be Taken”
A 2007 case in California demonstrates how controversial an article or editorial
can become even though it appears in a student newspaper with limited circulation. In
Smith v. Novato Unified School District, the Court of Appeals for the First District of
California reversed a lower court decision that had ruled in favor of the school district.
This complex case does not involve censorship per se, but illustrates the complicated
landscape that schools must negotiate in their attempts to maintain order, foster an
environment of tolerance, and yet protect student speech—all at the same time. The
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events of the case begin in the fall of 2001. A student, Andrew D. Smith, wrote an
editorial for a California high school newspaper, The Buzz, titled “Immigration,” which
contained the following statements:
•

“I'll even bet that if I took a stroll through the Canal district in San Rafael that
I would find a lot of people that would answer a question of mine with ‘que?’,
meaning that they don't speak English and don't know what the heck I'm
talking about.”

•

“Seems to me that the only reason why they can't speak English is because
they are illegal.”

•

“40% of all immigrants in America live in California ... because Mexico is
right across the border, comprende?”

•

“[I]f they can't legally work, they have to make money illegal way [sic]. This
might include drug dealing, robbery, or even welfare. Others prefer to work
with manual labor while being paid under the table tax free.”

•

“If a person looks suspicious then just stop them and ask a few questions, and
if they answer ‘que?’, detain them and see if they are legal.”

•

“Others seem to think that there should be a huge wall along the Mexican/U.S.
border.”

•

“Criminals usually flee here in order to escape their punishment.” 340

Understandably, tempers flared after the article was published, resulting in angry
phone calls from parents and even “community meetings” held at the school. However,
the student, angry at the negative reaction, was not deterred. Six months later, he wrote a
second, equally inflammatory article. The district reacted to the second article by
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publicly apologizing and promising not to allow the publication of any other such articles
on the immigration issue. Smith’s parents filed suit, alleging violations of Smith’s right
to free speech under the United States and California Constitutions and the California
Education Code. The suit also challenged the district's speech policies as “facially
invalid.”—meaning that the policy would be unconstitutional under all circumstances, no
matter how it was applied. The plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting further
infringement of speech and nominal damages of one dollar. 341
The trial court ruled in favor of the district and the individual defendants on all
causes of action. The judgment included an award of costs to the district, meaning that
the plaintiff may be responsible for thousands of dollars of legal bills incurred by the
school district in defending the lawsuit. 342 (Courts generally require each side to pay
their own expenses because the awarding of costs can discourage future meritorious
lawsuits from being filed.) However, the higher court—the California Court of
Appeals—disagreed with the judgment, saying:
The District sent the clear message that no further speech similar to
“Immigration” would be tolerated. In the aftermath of “Immigration” the
District succumbed to the fear of disruption and discontent. While
understandable, this was not permissible. “[I]n our system,
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute
regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's
opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or
on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an
argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take
this risk … and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—
this kind of openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this
relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.” … When faced with
offensive student speech, school districts must proceed cautiously with
due regard to the valuable rights at stake, rather than reacting impulsively
because of protest about the speech. 343
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Noting that classrooms should be models for the marketplace of ideas, the court of
appeals also said:
It is to the District's credit that it resisted the temptation to censor Smith's
second, similarly provocative opinion editorial, “Reverse Racism,” which
was published about six months later, in May 2002. Nevertheless, we are
bound to conclude that the District's response to “Immigration” infringed
on Smith's right to exercise freedom of speech and violated section
48907. 344
Those who are uncomfortable with students having so much freedom may wonder
why the school, which had a chance to stop the second article, nevertheless allowed the
article to be published despite the inevitable fallout. The answer may simply be that
California’s student press protections, which date to the 1970s, have been instilled in the
public school system in a deeper way than in other states. Put another way: Because the
article did not clearly fall within an exception to speech protections, the school chose not
to censor.
This case showed the willingness of California courts to grant students—even
with limited journalism experience and skills—the same rights that adults would enjoy in
a non-school context unless the student speech falls within one of the few exceptions.
School officials in California may be justified in wondering whether there are any limits
to student speech if it does not involve libel or obscenity. Yet there are many subjects
about which students can write that can cause problems for school officials that do not
fall into one of those categories of speech.
Vulgar Speech in States with Student Expression Protections
In 1996, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court similarly found that vulgar
student speech was protected under state law. In Pyle v. School Committee of South
Hadley, a unanimous Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the state’s student
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speech statute protected students’ rights to engage in even vulgar speech that is not in a
school-sponsored forum so long as it does not cause an actual disruption at school. 345 In
this case, two public school students were punished for wearing T-shirts which their
school administrators thought were vulgar and offensive. 346 One read “See Dick Drink.
See Dick Drive. See Dick Die. Don’t be a Dick” and another read “Coed Naked Band:
Do It To the Rhythm.” 347
The students argued that the school’s dress code violated their freedom of
expression, as protected by the state statute regarding student speech. 348 The court, in
finding for the students, noted the wording of the statute: “[t]he right of students to
freedom of expression in the public schools of the commonwealth shall not be abridged,
provided that such right shall not cause any disruption or disorder within the school.” 349
The statute contained no exceptions for vulgarity. Therefore, because the speech did not
cause a disruption, the court held that the statute was unambiguous as to its protections of
students’ speech in this context.350
However, even in states with strong student-expression statutes, such as
California, students do not always prevail in court. In Lopez v. Tulare Joint Union High
School District, students made a similar argument in asserting the right to use profanity at
school in an artistic context. 351 In this case, students sued school officials who had
censored the script of a student-produced film made in connection with a film arts
class. 352 The film attempted to address the problems of teenage pregnancy, following the
difficult lives of two teen protagonists and their baby, resulting in turmoil, conflict, and a
heart-wrenching separation. 353 The film dialogue included sparse use of curse words and
vulgar phrases, which the students thought appropriate to the material and which their
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advisor approved. 354 The school board demanded the vulgarities be cut from the film. 355
In so doing, school officials “made no finding on whether the profanity at issue was
legally obscene, but rested its decision solely on the grounds of educational
suitability.” 356 The Court found that under state law schools have the authority to censor
“four letter words” even in the context of student publications, because of the “special
nature of the high school environment.” 357 In finding for the school district, the court
reasoned that “[c]ensorship of ‘four letter words’ does not unduly hinder the students’
ability to express their ideas or opinions on any subject. It enjoins only the indecent
manner in which an idea is expressed.” 358
In comparing the two cases, one notes that both states have statutes strongly
protecting student expression. However, in the Pyle case, the vulgarity was manifested in
sexual innuendo (which was protected), while in Lopez, the vulgarity took the form of
four-letter words (which was not protected). The Lopez case shows that young people do
not always enjoy the same First Amendment rights as adults. A film with profanity
would obviously be constitutionally protected if made by adults, even if widely
distributed.
Speech Published on Social Media
One of the most nuanced areas of student speech jurisprudence is the distinction
state courts make between types of speech: verbal, student newspaper, social media, or
otherwise. When courts decide cases in states with no student speech statutes, it matters
a great deal what platform the student uses to express himself or herself.
In the 2012 case Tatro v. University of Minnesota, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota addressed the issue of whether a state university violated a student’s free
speech rights by disciplining Amanda Tatro, a 31-year-old undergraduate student in the
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Mortuary Science Program, for posting jokes about embalming cadavers on her Facebook
page. 359 Tatro was a highly unusual case that suggests the difficulty courts are having
(and will continue to have) with cases involving social media. For example, who could
view Tatro’s posts? The answer is complicated. Tatro’s posts were not viewable by
anyone with an Internet connection; they were viewable only by Tatro’s “friends” and
“friends of friends.” However, with Facebook and other social media, anyone with
access to otherwise private material can forward it to someone else, and a private joke
can quickly “go viral” and be accessed by untold numbers of people.
In one post, Tatro referred to a cadaver as “Bernie,” a reference to the movie
Weekend at Bernie’s, in which two men try to fool people into believing their dead friend
Bernie is alive. As Facebook users know, a post begins with the user’s name, so a post
often sounds like a person is writing about himself or herself in the third person. Such is
the case with this post:
Amanda Beth Tatro realized with great sadness that my best friend,
Bernie, will no longer be with me as of Friday next week. I wish to
accompany him to the resort. Now where will I go or who will I hang
with when I need to gather my sanity? Bye, bye Bernie. Lock of hair in
my pocket. 360
A fellow student read the posts and reported Tatro to the department director. After
meeting with other faculty, the department director notified university police. 361 The
university's disciplinary body charged Tatro with violating rules involving privacy and
respect for deceased individuals. Tatro was informed that her grade in the lab course had
been lowered from a C+ to an F, and she was forced to complete a mandatory psychiatric
evaluation, among other consequences. Tatro sought judicial review, arguing that the
disciplinary actions for her off-campus speech violated her First Amendment rights. The
ACLU of Minnesota filed a friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of Tatro. 362
126

Tatro conceded that her free speech rights are curtailed to some extent in the
context of professional obligations to the morgue and that there were limitations on what
she could post on Facebook about her work with human cadavers, but she argued that the
university’s rule was overbroad, encompassing any speech about the program. The court
(which treated the student’s social media speech as on-campus speech throughout the
proceedings), disagreed, finding that the university’s rules for the program were narrowly
tailored and based on established professional standards. It held that the university did
not violate Tatro’s free speech rights by sanctioning her. 363 Although the ACLU of
Minnesota expressed disappointment in the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in this
case, it noted some positive developments as a result of this ruling. For example, the
court agreed that the Tinker line of cases was not appropriate in the context of this case.
Although Tatro planned to seek further review of the court's decision, she died
unexpectedly on June 29, 2012. 364
A 2014 case from the U.S. District Court for Minnesota cites the Tatro case. In
Keefe v. Adams, a student who was removed from Central Lake College’s associate
degree nursing program brought A Section 1983 action against the college administrators,
alleging that they denied him due process and violated his right to free speech. (It will be
recalled that Section 1983 is a federal statute allowing civil suits against public officials
and those acting under “color of law” for deprivation of constitutional rights.) Among
many other inflammatory statements, he had called a classmate a “stupid bitch” on
Facebook. 365 The administrators asserted that they did not violate Keefe's First
Amendment rights by disciplining him for his statements on Facebook. Citing Tatro, the
defendants said that “courts have upheld against First Amendment challenge academic
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discipline for inappropriate social media postings that violate academic professional
standards.” They contended that they enforced recognized nursing standards against
Craig Keefe and that their interest in enforcing those standards outweighed any First
Amendment interest asserted by him. 366 The college’s motion for summary judgment
was granted.
Few people would condone the behavior of Tatro or Keefe. Nevertheless, such
cases raise difficult questions about how far a school may go in disciplining adult
students when administrators dislike a student’s statements published on social media. A
2010 article in The Chronicle of Higher Education noted that medical students, as a rite
of passage in the early 1900s, often posed with pictures of cadavers or skeletons. 367 The
book Dissection: Photographs of a Rite of Passage in American Medicine: 1880-1930
includes more than 100 photographs of medical students posing with their cadavers. 368 In
the early 20th Century, people would undoubtedly have been horrified if they had known
their doctors had posed with cadavers when they were medical students. Of course, this
information was known by only a select few and was kept secret. It was a private joke.
In the age of social media, students must understand that there is no such thing as a
private joke. Students must come to grips with the fact that their statements and behavior
will affect them in ways previous generations did not have to contend with. As the
Chronicle article noted, medical schools are beginning to address this problem by adding
a social media component to their ethics classes. 369 Beyond the legal questions
surrounding social media postings, students must understand that their online behavior
will affect them in the professional world.
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Hazelwood’s Occasional Bright Side
Despite the numerous obstacles faced by students living in states without antiHazelwood statutes, court decisions sometimes find in their favor even under the
Hazelwood standard. For example, in Griffith v. Butte School District No. 1, the Supreme
Court of Montana considered the case of a former high school student who alleged that
school officials violated her right to freedom of speech when it refused to allow her to
deliver a graduation speech that contained religious references. 370 Before the ceremony,
the student and her father met with the principal, who gave them a copy of the school
district’s policies and reminded the student that religious references would not be allowed
in students’ graduation speeches. 371
The court, in applying the Hazelwood standard, found that the district violated the
student’s constitutional right to free speech because the proposed speech did not fall
within any of the three recognized situations in which it is permissible for school officials
to impose a viewpoint-based limitation on student speech. 372 The court found it
untenable that the speech could be “perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school” and
that allowing it would violate the Establishment Clause, finding that “Griffith’s cursory
references to her personal religious beliefs could [not reasonably] be viewed by those in
attendance at the … graduation ceremony as a religious endorsement by the School
District.” 373
Speech About Speech
It’s clear that under the Hazelwood standard a student’s right to free speech is
limited, but what about speech that refers to unprotected speech? Just such an issue arose
in 1993 in Desilets on Behalf of Desilets v. Clearview Regional Board of Education, in
which the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey addressed whether
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schools can, under Hazelwood, censor speech reviewing or describing speech that would
be unprotected at school. 374
Judges have allowed schools to suppress student speech that is vulgar. However,
in Desilets, the court made it clear that there is a difference between (1) unprotected
speech that is vulgar and (2) protected speech that describes another work that is vulgar.
In Desilets, a junior high student sued school officials, alleging that they violated the
student’s constitutional rights when they censored from the student newspaper the his
reviews of R-rated movies. 375 The reviews, which were approved for publication by the
journalism teacher, 376 contained nothing offensive, lewd, vulgar, obscene, libelous,
insulting to the rights of others, or likely to be disruptive of or interfere with orderly
school conduct and discipline. Nor was the language inappropriate for immature
audiences. 377 However, the school claimed that because the reviews were about R-rated
movies, which would be inappropriate for immature audiences to view, it had a legitimate
pedagogical reason to censor the articles under the Hazelwood standard. 378
The appeals court distinguished the facts of this case from those in Hazelwood,
noting that “the material in Hazelwood was censored because of its content and
journalistic style. In the instant matter, it is conceded that the censorship had nothing to
do with the style of the review. Nor was the content of the reviews a basis for the
censorship, but only its subject matter.” 379 The court stressed the importance of this
distinction, explaining that “content is what is written; subject is what is written about” 380
and “the pedagogical interests of the school do not extend beyond the style and content of
the article.” 381

130

The court noted that decisions “concerning the appropriateness of a movie’s
content is ultimately a parental one, not an educational one” and that the censorship was
an extreme reaction to fears of parental objections. 382 The court noted that a simple
disclaimer would prevent any parent from misinterpreting the publication of the review in
the newspaper as an endorsement by the school. 383
While student expression rights prevailed in this instance, the fact that the school
district relied on the Hazelwood standard demonstrates the need for stronger student
expression protections through state legislation.
Strictly Verbal Speech
In the 2012 case People v. Rapp, the Court of Appeals of Michigan heard an
appeal of a criminal case in which the defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor of
disrupting campus officials after he angrily confronted a campus parking enforcement
officer about a parking ticket. 384 The defendant was charged with violating Michigan
State University Ordinance 15.05, which states: “[n]o person shall disrupt the normal
activity or molest the property of any person, firm, or agency while that person, firm, or
agency is carrying out service, activity or agreement for or with the University.” The
issue heard on this appeal was whether the language in the ordinance (making it an
offense to “disrupt the normal activity” of a protected person) was facially overbroad. 385
Among the reasons the court sided with the prosecution was a distinction between this
case and the one relied upon by the lower courts (City of Houston v. Hill ). 386 Hill is a
U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with a similar ordinance, passed by city government,
that criminalized verbal interruptions of any nature whatsoever of police. The ordinance
was found unconstitutionally overbroad. 387 The Court of Appeals of Michigan pointed
out that, unlike in Hill, the campus ordinance in Rapp did not target verbal speech. 388
131

Viewpoint Discrimination
In a New York case involving campus speech, a parent asserted that his child’s
school infringed upon THE child’s First Amendment rights by not allowing him to set up
a booth providing information on alternative career paths to military service at a career
day to which military recruiters were invited. In Macula v. Board of Education, the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York examined whether school officials
engaged in viewpoint discrimination by allowing military recruiters into the school but
prohibiting the plaintiff from setting up a “truth-in” table. 389 The court explained that in
a nonpublic forum like a school, officials may repress speech so long as they do so in a
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral manner. 390 The majority held that the school had not
violated the parent’s First Amendment rights because it had not endorsed the military’s
message or created a forum for military speech—it was merely complying with a statute
that mandates allowing military recruiters on campus. As such, the school was not
expressing disagreement with the parent’s views by denying his request to set up a “truthin” table during college days. Perhaps most people would find this reasoning
unconvincing. After all, why would the issue be that the school was endorsing the
message? That point hardly seems relevant to the First Amendment issues.
The dissenters argued that the information the plaintiff sought to provide was a
direct counterpoint to information that would be presented by the military recruiters.
Therefore, the school’s decision was not viewpoint neutral because it allowed the
recruiters to present their information but barred the plaintiff from doing the same. 391
But the court rejected that argument.
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Libel, Defamation, and Invasion of Privacy
When school officials consider suppressing student speech, they sometimes
invoke state statutes that allow them to act when the content is potentially libelous. But
some cases are brought not when students are demanding the right to publish, but when
teachers or students want to stop the publication of an article they think will be harmful.
In Salek v. Passaic Collegiate School, the Appellate Division of the Superior
Court of New Jersey decided a lawsuit brought by a faculty member who objected to
pictures in the yearbook that implied the teacher wanted to engage in sexual relationship
with another faculty member. 392 A section of the yearbook titled “The Funny Pages”
contained pictures of students and faculty with supposedly humorous captions, including
a picture of the plaintiff sitting next to and facing another teacher and a caption that read
“Not tonight Ms. Salek. I have a headache.” 393 The teacher unsuccessfully argued that
Hazelwood required school officials to exercise greater censorship over the content
and/or style of the yearbook. 394 The court held that the mere desire on the part of school
officials to avoid upsetting the teacher would not have justified the censorship of the
publication. 395
In Walko v. Kean College of New Jersey, a college administrator brought a
defamation suit against the college newspaper for a fake advertisement in a “spoof”
edition. 396 After examining the fake ad, the court held that the entire spoof section
contained not a single serious article that could be read as a factual statement or anything
other than a joke and therefore the ad was protected expression under the First
Amendment. 397 The Court said: “What is at stake here is the balance to be struck
between the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press, and the individual's
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interest in reputation, peace of mind, and freedom from emotional distress. On these
facts, freedom of the press outweighs the individual's interest.” 398
In examining student press law jurisprudence, it is remarkable how often April
Fools’ Day and spoof editions of student newspapers result in lawsuits. Although humor
and satire are important forms of expression that deserve strong protection, journalism
teachers and advisors may be forgiven for discouraging spoof editions in what is
otherwise a serious publication reporting factual news for the school community. Spoof
editions tend to showcase a lack of maturity and judgment on the part of some students,
often resulting in hurtful and embarrassing material.
Incitement, Disturbance, and Threats
One area where states without student speech statutes grant schools broad
discretion is when the student speech is considered threatening or may lead to disruptions
within the school. In J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, a Pennsylvania
school district’s decision to permanently expel a middle school student because of a
website containing threatening and derogatory comments about one of his teachers and
his principal, was found to be within the school’s authority. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania wrestled with the issue of whether a website created off campus would fall
under the constitutional jurisprudence for student speech. As the court noted, “The most
striking web page regarding Mrs. [Kathleen] Fulmer … was captioned, ‘Why Should She
Die?’ Immediately below this heading, the page requested the reader to ‘Take a look at
the diagram and the reasons I gave, then give me $20 to help pay for the hitman.’ “ 399
When school let out for the summer, he received a letter from the school district
informing them that it was aware of the website and that it intended to suspend J.S. for
three days, asserting that J.S. had violated school district policies on “threat[s] to a
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teacher, harassment of a teacher and principal, and disrespect to a teacher and principal,
each resulting in actual harm to the health, safety and welfare of the school
community.” 400 After hearings, the school district eventually decided to expel J.S. 401
J.S. appealed the expulsion to the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton
County, arguing that the school district violated his First Amendment rights. 402 The
Pennsylvania court took a “cautious approach that considered and balanced both the
constitutional rights of the student with the preservation of order and a proper educational
environment.” 403 The court found that there was a sufficient connection between the
website and the school to consider the speech as occurring on-campus. 404 While no one
disputed that the website was created off campus, the court found that “J.S. facilitated the
on-campus nature of the speech by accessing the web site on a school computer in a
classroom, showing the site to another student, and by informing other students at school
of the existence of the web site.” 405 Learning of the website, faculty members and school
administration also accessed the web site at school. 406 The court stated that it was
important that by its content, it was clear that J.S.’s website was “aimed not at a random
audience, but at the specific audience of students and others connected with this
particular school district” and that it was “inevitable” that the website would circulate on
school property. 407
The court considered several factors, known as the “Perkins Test” (derived from
the 2001 Wisconsin case State v. Perkins 408) in determining whether the content of J.S.’s
website constituted a true threat. The test includes how the recipient and other listeners
reacted to the alleged threat; whether the threat was conditional; whether it was
communicated directly to its victim; whether the makers of the threat had made similar
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statements to the victim on other occasions; and whether the victim had reason to believe
that the maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in violence. 409 The only factor
under which J.S.’s website could be considered a “true threat” was his teacher’s reaction
(she suffered “severe mental and physical harm”). 410 The death threat was not
accompanied by anything indicating it would or could be carried out. 411 The court
decided that the website, taken as a whole, was not a true threat, but “a sophomoric,
crude, highly offensive and perhaps misguided attempt at humor or parody.” 412
Nonetheless, if the speech disrupted school work, it would still be unprotected
speech. 413 J.S. argued that his speech was protected under Tinker because it caused
minimal disruption.414 The court disagreed, noting that while “there must be more than
some mild distraction or curiosity created by the speech ... complete chaos is not
required.” 415 The court found that the website had actually caused substantial disruption
on campus, including the direct and indirect impact of the emotional and physical harm to
his teacher. 416 The court noted that “as a result of Mrs. Fulmer's inability to return to
work, three substitute teachers were required to be utilized which disrupted the
educational process of the students.” 417 Because the speech was not protected by the
First Amendment, the school did not violate J.S.’s rights by expelling him. 418 The court
wrote:
In sum, the web site created disorder and significantly and adversely
impacted the delivery of instruction. Indeed, it was specifically aimed at
this particular school district and seemed designed to create precisely this
sort of upheaval. Based upon these facts, we are satisfied that the School
District has demonstrated that J.S.'s web site created an actual and
substantial interference with the work of the school to a magnitude that
satisfies the requirements of Tinker. 419
The issue of disruptive speech was also the subject of the 1997 New York State
case Board of Education of Monticello Central School Dist. v. Commissioner of
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Education. Citing the Hazelwood standard, the court in this case noted that the test for
disruptive speech is whether school officials have reason to believe the speech will
“substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other
students.” 420 A student had written articles in an off-campus newspaper encouraging
students to deface and defile the campus. 421 A school official testified that he was
“scared when he read the newspaper because he simply did not know how the students
would react to the article in question.” 422 The court concluded that, given the plain
language of the speech, school officials could reasonably have found that the article
constituted a threat to the quiet order of the school. 423
The New York courts faced the issue of student threats again in 2012 in Saad-ElDin v. Steiner, in which a student was punished for threatening to blow up the school. 424
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York was posed with the question
of whether a student must intend the speech as a threat or to cause actual disruption on
campus in order for it to fall outside the First Amendment protections. 425 The court held
that schools do not need to prove either actual or inevitable disruption, but that the
student speech was reasonably likely to result in disruption. 426 The court held that
although no one testified that they thought the student would actually blow up the school
(students thought it was a joke), “it was nevertheless reasonably foreseeable that such a
threat … would create a substantial disruption within the school.” 427
In the absence of state laws protecting students’ freedom of speech at school,
courts skew toward diminished rights. Although it is not realistic to expect that all state
legislatures will eventually adopt laws with strong student speech and press protection,
such efforts on the state level remain important. As the concluding chapter will explain,
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there are other avenues available—beyond amending state educational statutes—for those
who want stronger protection for student journalists.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
Student Speech Rights Should Be Strengthened
Both high school and college students are entitled to greater First Amendment
protection than they are currently given in most states. By providing enhanced First
Amendment protection, courts, legislators, and school officials will help students to learn
valuable lessons about the importance of free expression in a democratic society and will
better protect discussion of public issues. In a dissent from Hazelwood, Justice Brennan
cautioned that the Supreme Court majority’s approach could give license to a regime of
“thought control” in which unprincipled administrators “can camouflage viewpoint
discrimination as the ‘mere’ protection of students from sensitive topics”:
[Censorship] in no way furthers the curricular purposes of a student
newspaper, unless one believes that the purpose of the school newspaper is
to teach students that the press ought never report bad news, express
unpopular views, or print a thought that might upset its sponsors. 428
Prior restraint may be tolerated in certain circumstances in public high schools, but a
public school principal should be required to publish his or her reasons for such action,
and the reasons must satisfy certain criteria. This idea, along with other policy
recommendations for public and private schools, will be discussed below.
Student Newspapers Fill an Important Role
With nationwide newspaper cutbacks, fewer reporters cover the high school and
college beat. Students help fill the void with their reporting. Student reporting—even at
the high school level—has uncovered important stories that might otherwise not be
brought to public view. In September 2013, students writing for an Ohio high school
newspaper looked at public records and discovered that what their high school’s
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administration had called an “alleged assault” by a student was actually an alleged
rape. 429 In November 2013, students at a Staten Island high school broke a story about
how the answers to Department of Education standardized tests were posted online before
the test was administered. 430 These are just two recent examples of how students can
develop journalism skills while also helping to hold public institutions accountable.
The California Model
While the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment sets a
floor in terms of speech protection, a state may choose to provide greater protection for
speech and press, either under its constitution or statutory law, as long as it does not
infringe upon other constitutionally protected rights. Several state legislatures have
extended First Amendment protection to student journalists—both in K-12 and at the
college level—when their state courts seemed unwilling to enhance such rights. 431
In the context of student speech generally and high school newspaper publications
in particular, California has gone further than any other state in protecting these rights. 432
The California Education Code contains two relevant provisions that California courts
have interpreted as providing greater protection for student speech than does the First
Amendment (as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hazelwood and other cases).
First, Section 48907, which was added to the code in 1977, provides that “[p]upils of the
public schools…shall have the right to exercise freedom of speech and of the press
including, but not limited to…the right of expression in official publications, whether or
not the publications or other means of expression are supported financially by the school
or by use of school facilities.” 433 It further provides, “[p]upil editors of official school
publications shall be responsible for assigning and editing the news, editorial, and feature
content of their publications subject to the limitations of this section…” 434 Second,
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Section 48950 of the Code grants California students the same First Amendment
protections at school as they possess outside of school:
A school district operating one or more high schools, a charter school, or a
private secondary school shall not make or enforce a rule subjecting a high
school pupil to disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is
speech or other communication that, when engaged in outside of the
campus, is protected from governmental restriction by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 2 of Article I of
the California Constitution. 435
Taken together, Sections 48907 and 48950 provide more protection for student
speech than do the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court based on the First Amendment. 436
In California, even when a high school does not open a publication to student
groups or parents, which might have the effect of creating a limited public forum, school
officials may not exercise control over the content of the publication unless they can
establish an applicable exception under sections 48907 or 48950. Exceptions include
expression that is “obscene, libelous, or slanderous,” as well as “material that so incites
pupils as to create a clear and present danger of the commission of unlawful acts on
school premises or the violation of lawful school regulations, or the substantial disruption
of the orderly operation of the school.” 437
The Struggle for Consensus
With few state laws like California’s protecting student speech (and little
guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court), federal and state courts have had to contribute to
the development of student speech and press rights through a series of decisions that
attempt to balance the First Amendment with the need for school officials to maintain a
positive learning environment. As discussed throughout the dissertation, court rulings
often reflect the fact that high school students generally do not have significant
journalism experience and may have limited skills when it comes to researching and
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writing stories. Students may also not understand the potential harm that inaccurate
information or an invasion of privacy might cause.
One example of the difficulty of granting high school students complete control
over school newspapers is their handling of April Fools editions. These editions, many of
which have been the subject of lawsuits, often print outrageous lies and humiliating jokes
about innocent people—in a publication that otherwise is supposed to report serious
news. Such editions often enrage the community and leave readers wondering whether
the high school newspaper is a serious journalistic effort or a joke.
School officials are understandably concerned about the public image of their
institutions. It is, therefore, understandable that they would want to prevent the
publication of stories that are embarrassing or reflect poorly on the school in some other
way. The difficulty for courts, legislators, parents, and concerned citizens is knowing
when a student publication is being censored because school officials want to limit the
dissemination of negative information as opposed to the more commonly stated reason:
the article was not journalistically sound. In Hazelwood, Principal Reynolds claimed that
the right sources weren’t interviewed for the article (e.g. the parents in the divorce story)
and that a student’s privacy would have been invaded (revealing her pregnancy). As
Justice White noted, “Reynolds was concerned that, although the pregnancy story used
false names ‘to keep the identity of these girls a secret,’ the pregnant students still might
be identifiable from the text.” 438
What the Law Should Require
State laws do not have to go as far as California’s to be effective. While
censorship of clearly defamatory and false information or invasion of privacy may be
necessary, administrators should never use their power to censor accurate reporting.
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Laws involving speech and press rights at the K-12 level should include procedures to
determine when a high school principal (or teacher or media advisor) is attempting to
stop the publication of an article because it is embarrassing rather than because it is
sloppy and potentially libelous journalism. With such a law, a principal at a public high
school who stops the publication of an article should be required to issue a statement
immediately, explaining the reasons why he or she took such action. If the reason is that
the article represented unfair reporting or was poor journalism, the principal needs to
explain in the statement the reasons for reaching that conclusion. The law should require
an outside panel of journalists who would independently determine whether the work
done by the students failed to meet minimal journalistic standards.
The law should also provide some penalty for a principal who is caught stopping
an article for an insufficient reason. The outside panel of journalists should be appointed
by the local board of education, and the panel’s meetings should be open to the public.
Additionally, the school board should be required to submit the principal’s or educator’s
reasoning for the censorship to the local newspaper of record. Local newspaper editors
often feel it is part of their duty to support the journalistic efforts of students in their
communities. Once the panel convenes, the story that was censored will probably enter
public discourse anyway, possibly in a local newspaper or newscast. Fear of having a
local news outlet reporting on a “censorship” story, as well as a potentially negative
ruling from the outside panel, will probably discourage principals in the future from
silencing a story.
The Local Option
None of this is to say that local schools cannot decide on their own that they
would like their school newspapers to be public forums. It is possible for a school district
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to designate a student publication as a public forum, and the Student Press Law Center
offers a template for school boards to accomplish this goal. 439 The decision to identify
the student newspaper as a limited public forum would send the message that school
officials recognize the importance of a free press and want the students to have the
chance, within some limits, to learn the craft of journalism and to inform the community
about important issues.
One could also argue that the Supreme Court implicitly recognized in Hazelwood
that a public forum could be created simply by showing an express intent that the
newspaper be treated as a forum—meaning the student newspaper is available to the
public—rather than treated as a classroom teaching vehicle. Justice White said:
School facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school
authorities have by policy or by practice opened the facilities for
indiscriminate use by the general public, or by some segment of the
public, such as student organizations. 440
The Court did not provide much of a road map for what criteria would give rise to
a forum, but in several rulings, judges found that a public forum existed through
longstanding institutional practice. For example, in Dean v. Utica , Judge Tarnow said:
Based on the evidence in the record, the Court finds that the Arrow is a
limited public forum because it has been opened for use by the public for
speech and discussion concerning matters that are relevant to the Utica
High School community and its readership. 441
Thus, the decision to have a public forum can be made by the school district and
does not require a court to declare such a principle in a lawsuit.
Hosty Is Unreasonable
Even if there is agreement that high school students need some supervision when
it comes to publishing the school newspaper, there is less compelling reason to apply
such restrictions to university students. Student editors at public university newspapers
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are adults and should have complete editorial control. However, this invites a question: If
the article or report is created for class credit, should the professor or advisor have the
power to censor the material? The answer should be no. There is a complicated
relationship among the quality of an article, the right to publish that article, and the grade
given to the article’s author. Advisors and professors may give a low grade because of
the poor quality of the article but still allow it to be published. One reason for this
seeming inconsistency is that college students need to learn from their mistakes and see
the consequences of publicly disseminating poorly researched and poorly written stories.
Private Schools
California is so far the only state that has enhanced student speech rights at
private schools (both high school and college). To date, there have not been any court
cases involving the question of whether private schools must use their money and
resources to publish anything students demand. If such a case arises, a court is likely to
hold that no private school is required to publish a newspaper, but if it does so, the
students who work on the paper are entitled to the protection granted under the California
law. The reality is that private schools may choose to forego having a student newspaper
altogether rather than have a newspaper over which they have limited control, or no
control at all. Public universities, funded by taxpayers and subject to the First
Amendment, should not have the power to censor the student newspaper. However,
private universities exist in large part to be “places of refuge,” for lack of a better phrase,
for people who do not believe in the way public universities are operated. For example,
public universities must abide by the separation of church and state. Private universities,
by contrast, may choose to be a religious school that requires chapel attendance or group
prayer. The government cannot force private universities to eliminate such requirements.
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The strongest argument for student editorial freedom at a private university is not
one based on the First Amendment; instead, it is an argument for quality and reputation.
A private school may want a strong journalism program to attract students and to have
school media operated by students that provide information about the institution to the
community. The most respected student newspapers give editorial control to the
students. In fact, the College Media Association—the nation’s largest group of student
newspaper advisors—has a code of ethics stating that it is unethical for an advisor to do
anything other than advise:
Faculty, staff and other non-students who assume advisory roles with
student media must remain aware of their obligation to defend and teach
without censoring, editing, directing or producing. It should not be the
media adviser’s role to modify student writing or broadcasts, for it robs
student journalists of educational opportunity and could severely damage
their rights to free expression. 442
Nationwide Standards
The First Amendment is part of a national charter, and it can be troublesome
when it means one thing in one state and something else in another, especially in an era in
which communication extends beyond state and national borders. But the courts
frequently allow states to adopt local standards within the framework of national rules.
For example, in Gertz v. Welch, the Supreme Court nationalized the standards for public
officials and public figures, but said states can determine the standard for private persons
as long as there is negligence:
So long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define
for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood which injures a private individual
and whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent. 443
As California’s model of student free speech has shown, it is wise to allow states
some flexibility. The rest of the country can look to California as an example of student
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press freedom and see whether granting such freedom has created serious problems.
Nevertheless, finding the right balance between allowing state experimentation and
enforcing uniform national principles is not easy to find. Courts and legislators will
continue to deal with questions of how much discretion individual states should have in
regulating student media.
The founders of the United States knew that a democracy requires the free flow of
information for citizens to be well informed about civic affairs. Freedom of speech, in
addition to allowing informed participation in self-government, can enrich the lives of
individuals who participate in various expressive activities, especially in student
journalism.
Possibilities for Future Research
Although this dissertation revealed and interpreted the results of legal research,
the topic of student free speech is suitable for exploration by historians, anthropologists,
sociologists, psychologists, and communication scholars, to name just a few other
disciplines.
For example, quantitative researchers could survey students, teachers, legislators,
and members of the general public about their attitudes toward student free speech. A
quantitative study could lead to unexpected findings, such as the possibility that most
students do not worry about their speech or press rights—or that the general public is
more supportive of student free speech than previously thought. After quantitative
researchers uncover the attitudes toward student free speech among different
demographic groups, qualitative researchers could conduct focus groups, in-depth
interviews, or even ethnographies to discover why these groups hold such attitudes.
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The previous five chapters demonstrate that there is a story to be told regarding
student free speech. Historians wanting to explore the history and development of
student free speech in the United States would be writing about an important topic, but
locating the people involved and persuading them to talk candidly about their experiences
and decisions might be difficult. For example, school officials may be hesitant to
comment about issues that were the subject of litigation or may reflect poorly on the
decisions they made. Former students might be hard to find and their memories of the
events and their thinking about the issues during the relevant time period may have faded.
Unlike some historical subjects, there might be limited written records of what transpired
at the time of the controversy.
Likewise, the future of student speech and press rights will be full of surprises and
insights. The role of social media will continue to grow. Communication scholars
should examine how Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms are affecting
what students are allowed to say both on and off campus. The law—both case law and
statutes—is not well developed when it comes to how much First Amendment protection
students should have when using social media to communicate statements and opinions
about school officials or school issues. The extent to which school policies should apply
differently to the publications (such as the school newspaper) and student comments on
social media needs to be fully considered. Student speech, including student journalism,
has different ramifications when published online.
The First Amendment does not have an age limit. Students are entitled to
substantial protection when exercising such rights, whether in a school-sponsored media
outlet or through social media. But balancing the free speech rights of students with
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other societal interests will continue to challenge parents, judges, legislators, school
officials, and of course, students.
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Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.8), or law-breaking, (Ark. Code Ann., § 6-18-1204.4, subd. (A); Cal. Educ. Code, §
48907, subd. (a), 76120; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.3, subd. (d); Iowa Code Ann., § 280.22.2, subd.
(c)(1); Kans. Stat. Ann., § 72-1506, subd. (c); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann., §§ 336.477.4, subd. (d)(A), 351.649);
rule breaking, (Ark. Code Ann., § 6-18-1204.4, subd. (B); Cal. Educ. Code, § 48907, subd. (a), 76120;
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.3, subd. (d); Iowa Code Ann., § 280.22.2, subd. (c)(2); Kans. Stat. Ann.,
§ 72-1506, subd. (c); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann., §§ 336.477.4, subd. (d)(B), 351.649); or to prevent the
distribution of journalism products that are obscene, (Ark. Code Ann., § 6-18-1204.1; Cal. Educ. Code, §§
48907, subd. (a), 76120; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.3, subd. (a); Iowa Code Ann., § 280.22.2, subd.
(a); Kans. Stat. Ann., § 72-1506, subd. (c)), or slanderous or libelous. (Ark. Code Ann., § 6-18-1204.2; Cal.
Educ. Code, § 48907, subd. (a), 76120; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 22-1-120.3, subds. (b), (c); Iowa Code
Ann., § 280.22.2, subd. (b); Kans. Stat. Ann., § 72-1506, subd. (c); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann., §§ 336.477.4, subd.
(a), 357.649.)
432
Smith v. Novato Unified School Dist., 150 Cal. App. 4th 1439, 1452 (Cal. App. 2007) (holding
that while Hazelwood “remains the controlling standard under the First Amendment for school-sponsored
speech, California courts have held that section 48907 [of the California Education Code] provides broader
protection for student speech in California public school newspapers.”)
433

Cal Ed Code § 48907.

434

Id.

435

Cal Ed Code § 48950.

436
Leeb v. Delong, 198 Cal. App. 3d 47, 54 (Cal. App. 1988) (Holding that, as a matter of
California statutory law, “[t]he broad power to censor expression in school sponsored publications for
pedagogical purposes recognized in [Hazelwood] is not available to this state's educators.”)
437

Cal. Educ. Code § 48907 (West).
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Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988).

439
SPLC Model Guidelines for High School Student Media,
http://www.splc.org/article/1998/09/student-press-law-center-model-guidelines-for-high-school-student-
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media (last visited Jan. 1, 2015).
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Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 260-61 (1988).

441

Dean v. Utica Cmty. Sch., 345 F. Supp. 2d 799, 806 (E.D. Mich. 2004).

CMA's Code of Ethical Behavior, http://www.collegemedia.org/about_cma/code_of_ethics/
(last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 324 (1974).
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